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Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value
William W. Bratton·
This Article addresses the implications that the Enron coUapse holds out for the selfregulatory system of corporate govemance. The case shows that the incentive structure that
motivates actors in the system generates much less powerJiJi checks against abuse than many
observers have believed Even as academics have proclaimed rising govemance standards,
some standards have decline4 particularly those addressed to the numerology ofshareholder
ralue. The Articles inquiry begins with Enron s business plan. The Article asserts that there
may be more to Enron s "virtual firm" strategy than meets the eye beholding a firm in coUapse.
The Article restates the strategy as an appheation ofthe incomplete contracts theory ofthe firm
that prevails in microeconomics today and asserts that Enron failed because its pursuit of
immediate shareholder value caused it to misapply the economi~ mistaking its own inHated
stock market capitalization for fimdamental value. The Article proceeds to Enron s coUapse.
telling four causation stories. This er ante description draws on infonnation available to the
actors who forced Enron into bankruptcy in December 2001. The discussion accounts for the
behavior ofEnron s principals byreference to the shareholder value nonn andEnron s corporate
culture. Finally. the Article takes up the self-regulatory system of corporate govemance.
asserting that the case justifies no fimdamental refonn. The costs of any significant new
regulation can outweigh the compliance yiel4 particularlyin a system committed to open a wide
field for entrepreneurial risk taking. Ifwe seek high re~ we must discount for the risk that
rationality and reputation will sometimes prove inadequate as constraints. At the same time. we
should hold critical gatekeepers, particularly auditors, to high professional standards. The
Article argues that present refonn discussions respecting the audit fimction do not adequately
COMont the problem ofcapture demonstrated in this case.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

rv.

Each economic expansion brings forth an investment so good that
people treat it as having broken the iron law of risk and return-the
economic teaching that those who want big returns have to take big
risks. fu the 1920s, the investment was common stocks bought on
margin. fu the 1960s, it was Nifty Fifty growth stocks. fu the 1970s, it
was commodities whose prices were going to rise forever. fu the
1980s, it was the junk bond, a miracle of fmancial science that offered
a super-normal return without a greater risk of defau1t. fu the late
1990s, it was new-economy stocks that levitated on heroic productivity
stories and predictions of a 36,000 Dow. And then came Enron.
Enron flew high. When its stock price peaked at close to ninety
dollars in August 2000, it was America's seventh largest fIrm by
market capitalization.\ fu one category it even had the number one
slot-Fortune Magazine hailed it as America's most innovative fIrm
for fIve years running.2 Enron also came in number one when it fell.
It went into Chapter 11 on December 2, 2001, as the largest
bankruptcy reorganization in American history.3 Meanwhile, its stock
1.
The price/earnings ratio was sixty, however.
2.
Pratap ChatteIjee, Enron: Pulling the Plug on the Global Power Broker,
CORPWATCH, at 6, available athttp://www.corpwatch.orglissuesIPRTJsp?articIeid=1016 (Dec.
13,2001).
3.
Wendy Zellner et aI., The FaJI ofEnron, Bus. WK., Dec. 17,2001, at 30, 33.
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had fallen to around sixty cents a share,4 victim to two more Enron
superlatives-history's biggest fmancial fraud and its biggest audit
failure.
At ftrst the nation's fmancial system took the crack up in stride,
adjusting the share prices of Enron's biggest lenders a notch
downwards. Growing worries about other frrms' fmancial reports
fmally caused a major market correction two months latee The
residuum of insecurity will continue to raise risk premiums and
depress stock prices.6 But the most visible victims are Enron's
stockholders and employees, especially the employees who were
shareholders. Even as 4000 were laid off around the time of the
bankruptcy filing, all faced the grim realization that in the company's
fmal weeks management had locked down their 40l(k) plan, which
had been sixty-percent invested in Enron stock.'
Corporate failures as big and fast as this one tend to be held out
as examples for future business regulation. Enron's failure is no
exception, implicating a long list of regulatory topics well before
completion of formal investigations into the company's management
and the collapse's cause. On its face Enron raises issues for the future
of energy deregulation, the mandatory disclosure system under the
securities laws,S the regulation of the accounting profession, and
Peter Coy et aI., Enron: Running on Empty, Bus. WK., Dec. 10,2001, at 80,80.
Gretchen Morgenson, UVnies of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a
Pounding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl.
6.
Steve Liesman, The Outlook: Enron Fallout May Cut Stock Prices in General,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, atAl. The insecurity also has caused a marked contraction of the
commercial paper market, which, in turn, will cause borrowing costs to rise significantly at
corporations losing access to this inexpensive source of credit. Gregory Zuckerman, Cash
Drought: A Dwindling Supply ofShan-Term Credit Plagues Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar.
28,2002, at AI.
7.
401(k) plans are not subject to ERISA's constraints on investments by dermed
benefit pension plans, which are subject to a ten percent cap on investment in the employer
finn's stock. Enron is by no means the only company whose employees' 401(k) plans are
heavily invested in their own stock. Each of the plans of Coca-Cola, Anheuser-Busch, Dell
Computer, Abbott Laboratories, and Proctor & Gamble was invested with more than eighty
percent in company stock as of December 200 1. Ellen E. Schultz, Employers Fight Limits on
Firm's Stock in 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at Cl.
For an excellent discussion of the implications of the 401 (k) diversification question, see
David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership (working paper) (on file with
author).
8.
The fact that Enron made special disclosures about investments in Special
Purpose Entities (SPE) to investors in the entities has created a stir on the ground that SPE
investors should not have more information than other investors in the marketplace. See
Diana B. Henriques & Kurt EichenwaId, A Fog Over Enron, and the Legal Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at MB 1. Why this should be is a puzzle, at least apart from the recently
promulgated Regulation FD. Under the materiality convention of Generally Accepted
4.
S.
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internal corporate governance systems.9 For employee pensions, the
wheels of action started to turn even before the end of 2001 as bills
were introduced in the House and Senate to limit the amount of
company securities in 401(k) retirement plans to ten or twenty
percent. 10 Legislation has since been presented covering a range of
subjects. ll
The claims of regulatory failure have a sharp edge due to Enron's
proftle as one of corporate America's most aggressive political players.
Deregulatory politics lay at the core of the company's business plan.
Its primary business, energy trading, only came into existence in the
wake of deregulation of electricity and natural gas production and
supply. Led by its founding chief executive officer (CEO), Kenneth L.
Lay, Enron went from state to state to prod local regulators to mandate
the unbundling of vertically integrated utilities. 12 It succeeded in
twenty-four states/3 clearing a field for the creation of new markets it
could exploit. These political successes earned Enron admiration in

Accounting Principles (GAAP), see DAVID R. HERWI1Z & MATTHEW J. BARRETI,
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 71 (3d ed. 2001), fmancial statements do not report all details
respecting a business for fear of incoherent results. Meanwhile, to induce a private investor
to join in a particular project is to provide detailed information about that project, subject to a
confidentiality agreement. Such an inequality of information is a necessary result when
reporting companies do project fmance, joint ventures, and private placements.
9.
Even the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act has come in for questioning on the
ground that the losses of Citibank and the Morgan Bank might have been lower had they not
been providing Enron with investment banking services. Jeanne Cummings et aI., Enron
Lessons: Finns Need to Have Assets, and Auditors Oversight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at
AI.
10. Schultz, supmnote 7, at CI.
11. See, e.g., S. 2003, 107th Congo (2002) (providing for a variety of reforms
respecting fmancial accounting); Auditor Independence Act of 2002, S. 1896, 107th Congo
(2002) (prohibiting auditors from providing management services); Independent Investment
Advisers Act of2002, S. 1895, 107th Congo (2002) (requiring investment advisors to disclose
ties with companies being analyzed by them); Fully Informed Investor Act of2002, S. 1897,
107th Congo (2002) (requiring disclosure of the sale of securities by an officer to be made
available quickly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)). In addition, SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt, responding to an immediate need to restore confidence in the audit
process, has proposed a new internal disciplinary structure for the accounting profession.
See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, SEC Proposes Accounting Disciplinmy Body, WALL ST. J., Jan.
17,2002, at CI.
12. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Editorial, Enron = Deregulation?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
2001, at A19. Enron started out as a natural gas pipeline at a time when oil was lower-priced.
Its natural gas business began to flourish after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) changed its rules in 1985 to permit utilities to shop for gas and pipelines and to
search for customers. Wendy Zellner et aI., Enron Power Play, Bus. WK. ONLINE, at
http://www.businessweek.coml2001/01_07/b3719001.htm (Feb. 12,2001).
13. Leslie Wayne, Enron, Preaching Deregulation, Worked the Statehouse Circuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at BI.

s
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business circles as a center of innovation and entrepreneurship. 14
Jeffrey Skilling, who succeeded Lay as Enron's CEO in February 2001
(to resign the following August as stonn clouds gathered), described a
ftnn with a mission against entrenched monopoly and its paid
protectors in government. Enron was "on the side of the angels":
In every business we've been in, we're the good guys. That's why they
don't like us. Customers love us, but the incumbents don't like us.
We're bringing the benefits of choice and free markets to the world.
You have no idea how frustrating it was in the early days of gas. They
ls
had built all the rules to protect their monopolies.

But even as Enron fought and won battles against protected energy
monopolies, it succeeded to and surpassed their influence activities. 16
Enron spent copiously on politics. For example, the $2.4 million
of political contributions it paid in 2000 exceeded by 100% those of
the next-most-generous energy company.17 In 2000, Enron also paid
$2.1 million to a dozen or so Washington lobbying ftnns.IS Enron
obtained good results from such investments, notably in connection
with the passage in 2000 of the Commodity Futures Modernization

Zelineret aI., supra note 3, at 30.
OnLine Extra: Q &- A with Enrons Skilling, Bus. WK. ONLINE, at
http://www.businessweek.coml2001l01_071b371901O.htm (Feb. 12, 200 I).
16. Enron's state-level political activities were not in a strict sense ever directed to
securing deregulation of energy production and distribution. For Enron, deregulation meant
special legislative protection for its own business model. It encouraged the states to mandate
their utilities' unbundling along lines suited to Enron's lines of business, leaving open no
playing field for the operation of competing business models. See Jenkins, supra note 12, at
A19.
Enron at first joined the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, a forum organized by
academics in 1991. In 1994, it withdrew its support from the group due to disagreements
about the shape restructurings should take. Letter from Professor Richard Pierce (Feb. 12,
2002) (on file with author).
It also is noted that Enron's operations abroad have earned the opprobrium of human
rights activists, in particular \vith respect to its $3 billion joint venture with the state utility of
Maharashtra in India. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented
human rights abuses on the part oflocal police officers acting as a private security force for
Enron. They accuse Enron's cops of beating local opponents of the power plant and of
dragging citizens out of their homes and then beating them for refusing to cooperate with the
firm. Chatterjee, supra note 2, ~ 33.
17. Enron spent $10.2 million on influence in Washington between 1997 and 2000.
During his political career, George W. Bush has received $774,100 from Enron itself and
Enron's management, $312,500 of which he received during his gubernatorial campaign.
Chatterjee, supra note 2.
18. Robert Kuttner, Editorial, The Lesson ofEnron: Regulation Isn't A Dirty U0r~
Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 200 I, at 24. One of these representatives was Marc Racicot, now the
Republicans' national chairman.
14.

15.
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Act. 19 Senator Phil Gramm, spouse of Wendy Gramm, one of Enron's
outside directors and a member of its audit committee,20 assured that
the legislation included the ''Enron Point;' a complete exclusion for
energy trading companies from rmancial or disclosure requirements
respecting portfolios of over-the-counter derivative securities. Enron
thereby achieved something available to no other leading dealer in
derivative contracts--complete exemption of its activities from federal
supervision and oversight.21
Yet none of Enron's political friends came forward when it
approached the Treasury for a bailout in late 2001. Washington
Republicans kept the fIrm at a conspicuous distance. 22 Even so, Enron
associations now soil politicians on a per se basis.23 Any sign of past
proximity to the rIrm drives the press into a frenzy. The same goes for
the business community, where scrutiny extends to the conduct of its
largest lenders, IP. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, llC. 24
Remarkable extremes have been reached by a press eager for scandal:

19. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
20. She is alleged to have received between $915,000 and $1.85 million in
compensation from Euron between 1993 and 2001. Bob Herbert, Editorial, Enron and the
Gramms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2002, atA29. How much of the deferred portion of this she
now gets to collect remains in question.
21. Makers of comparable products are either banks, broker-dealers, commodities
dealers, or exchanges or their members, and thereby subject to regulation under one or
another federal regime.
22. See, e.g., Cummings et aI., supra note 9, at AI; Michael Schroeder, Enron
Debacle Will Test Leadership of SECs New Chief, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001, at AlO
(discussing comments of President George W. Bush on Euron).
23. For an analysis along these lines, see Albert R. Hunt, Editorial, A Scandal
Centerpiece: Enron s Political Connections, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,2002, atAl5.
Vice President Cheney takes the worst of this by virtue of his energy policy portfolio.
Unfortunately for Cheney, his contacts were not limited to policy discussion. At Lay's
request, he met with Indian officials in June 2001 to pressure them for concessions in respect
of an ongoing political battIe between Euron and the Maharashtra state utility. Richard A.
Oppel, Jr., Despite WamJiJg Enron ChiefUrged Buying ofShares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,2002,
atA1.
24. The SEC is investigating Morgan for delaying full disclosure of its Euron losses.
These ftrst were said to be $900 million, a ftgure later raised to $2.6 billion because
guarantors of Morgan's position have refused to pay. The matter is in litigation. Jathon
Sapsford & Anita Raghavan, Trading Charges: Lawsuit Spotlights J.R Morgan s Ties to the
Enron Debacle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, atAl; Anita Raghavan et aI., SEC Examines Ties
Between Banks and Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at C1. Citigroup seems to have
engineered a preference for itseIf-a $250 million bootstrap from unsecured to secured status
for itself in respect of the last rounds of prebankruptcy lending. Jathon Sapsford & Mitchell
Pacelle, Citigroup s Enron Financing Stirs Controversy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at C I.
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You get your name in the paper simply by virtue of being a purchaser
of a private placement note of an Enron equity a1Iiliate.25
As with the political community, Enron failed to rmd significant
sources of support in the business community as it struggled to stay
solvent. Many saw it as an arrogant, uncooperative player.26 It had
insisted on, and succeeded in, getting its own way with business
counterparties as well as government regulators.27 Its famously opaque
rmancial statements showed that Enron found it neither necessary nor
desirable to share a clear picture of its operations and rmances with
either its own shareholders or the wider rmancial community. This
was a firm whose CEO, Skilling, publicly castigated as an "asshole"
an analyst who had the temerity to ask a critical question about Enron's
rmancial reports.2S When rmancial journalist, Bethany McLean, asked
early questions about the company, in Is Enron Overpriced?,29 Skilling
accused her of being unethical for publishing an underresearched
piece.30
Two schools of thought show up prominently in discussions of
the meaning of Enron's collapse. On one side stand supporters of
deregulation, many of whom once touted Enron and now rmd it more
than a little embarrassing. Its collapse, they tell us, should be taken as
an exemplar of free market success.3l If Enron was a house of cards, it
was free market actors who blew it down, with a free market
administration keeping its hands off. Any violations of law will be
brought to light through investigations by the Congress, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Justice Department, along
with fact rmding connected with a raft of pending lawsuits.

25. Gretchen Morgenson, Many May Be Surprised to Be Enron Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at C1.
26. See ZeHner et aI., supra note 3, at 34.
27. Enron used its clout as a source offees to buHy actors in the fmancial community
to participate in increasingly dubious off-balance sheet fmancings. Wendy Zellner et aI., The
Man Behind the Deal Machine, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at 40,40-41.
28. Special Report-Enron: TheAmazing Disintegrating Finn, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8,
2001, at 61 [hereinafter Special Reporij. The incident occurred in April 2001. Heather
Timmons, Men Execs Protest Too Much, Bus. WK., Jan. 14,2002, at 8,8.
29. Bethany McLean, IsEnron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 123
30. Felicity Barringer, 10 Months Ago, Questions on Enron Came and ~nt with
Little Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, atAl1.
31. For a bizarre example of this thinking, see John Rossant, Editorial, Mya Few
Enrons U0uld Do Europe Good, Bus. WK., Dec. 31, 2001, at 58,58 (asserting that Enron
shows that government support for industry is a bad thing).
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Meanwhile, the histories of rogues and outliers like Enron never
provide a sound basis for new regulatory initiatives.32
On the opposite side stand those, including this Article's author,
predisposed to draw regulatory inferences from business disasters.
Enron, with its reputation as America's corporate shock troop for
radical reliance on market discipline and concomitant dismantling of
the New Deal regulatory legacy,33 provides an especially attractive
basis for argument. These assertions encompass power supply, the
deregulation of which, according to one recent commentator,
"guaranteed that sharks such as Enron would emerge to cream profits
by manipulating supply.,,34 They encompass campaign finance reform,
in the eyes of many a necessary prerequisite to any other law reform
triggered by Enron.35 And they encompass business law, in particular
corporate and securities law's system of self-regulatory corporate
governance.
This Article addresses the self-regulatory regime of corporate
governance, to which Enron comes as a considerable shock. In the
1990s, corporate self-regulation had been widely thought to have
reached a high plateau of evolutionary success due to proliferating
good practices and sophisticated institutional monitoring. Yet the
failure in this case stemmed not from business reversal, which often
cannot be avoided, but from legerdemain, which usually can be
controlled. The breaking stories defied explanation-$30 million of
self-dealing by the chief fmancial officer, $700 million of net earnings
going up in smoke, $1.2 billion of shareholders' equity disappearing as
if by erasure of a blackboard, more than $4 billion in hidden
liabilities-and all in a company theretofore viewed as an exemplar.
How could this happen in a corporate governance and disclosure
system held out as the envy of the world? Either deeply concealed
skullduggery or some hidden regulatory defect requiring legislative
correction must have been at work.
As the scandal deepens and the criminal justice system comes to
bear, the concealed skullduggery characterization becomes more
32. For this point of view, see Editorial, Investigating Enron, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30,
2001, atAI4; Jenkins, supmnote 12.
33. Paul Krugman, Editorial, Laissez Not Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,2001, atA27.
34. Kuttner, supm note 18, at 24. Many accuse Enron of manipUlation and
profiteering in connection with California's power shortage of 2000 and 2001. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Signs Enron Bet on Price Increase Before California Power Shortage,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,2002, at CI.
35. See Stephen Labaton, Auditing Firms Exercise Powerin Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19,2002, atAI (quoting Professor James Cox).
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prominent. The principals emerge as rogues, to be roughly expelled by
the respectable business community. There lies much truth in the
characterization. But the rogue characterization serves a double
function-it deflects attention from the respectable community's own
business practices.
This Article aspires to counterbalance with a picture of Enron's
collapse that deemphasizes the rogue to focus on the regular. It
reviews the particulars of the case, emphasizing the points of
continuity between Enron and respectable fIrms. It asserts that Enron
in collapse was wrought into the fabric of our corporate governance
system every bit as much as Jack Welch's General Electric (GE) was in
success. Like GE under Jack Welch, Enron under Ken Lay and Jeff
Skilling pursued maximum shareholder value. Like GE's managers,
Enron's pursued a plausible and innovative business plan. The fIrm
collapsed for the most mundane of reasons-its managers suffered the
behavioral biases of successful entrepreneurs. They overemphasized
the upside and lacked patience. They pursued heroic short-term
growth numbers that their business plan could not deliver. That pursuit
of immediate shareholder value caused them to become risk-prone,
engaging in levered speculation, earnings manipulation, and
concealment of critical information.
They were rogues to be sure, but the self-regulatory system
nevertheless is deeply implicated in their company's failure. Enron's
collapse reminds us that our corporate governance system takes some
significant risks in the name of encouraging innovation and
entrepreneurship and economizing on enforcement costs. Enron's
principals abused the system in plain view, taking advantage of the
considerable slack it extends to successful actors. Although they did
not disclose everything, they disclosed more than enough to put the
system's layers of monitors on notice that their earnings numbers were
soft and their liabilities understated. Similarly aggressive accounting
and soft numbers are commonplace in business today. They have
become wrought into the practice of shareholder value maximization.
The theory of shareholder value maximization tells a different
story, of course. Academics defme shareholder value by reference to
management practices that enhance productivity-corporate
unbundling and concentration on core competencies, the return of free
cash flow to shareholders, compensation schemes that align incentives,
and prompt restructuring of dysfunctional operations. But in the
transfer from theory to practice, the set of economic instructions
diffuses into a norm. The norm is informed by the demands of
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1283 2001-2002
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shareholders themselves in addition to the official economics. As the
nonn becomes more capacious it takes on a dark side, a negative
aspect quite apart from the pain it inflicts on millions of employees for
whom the cost-cutting entailed in restructuring means termination.
For equity investors in recent years, the practice of shareholder value
maximization has not meant patient investment. Instead, it has meant
obsession with short-tenn perfonnance numbers. For managers, the
shareholder value nonn accordingly has come to mean more than
astute investment and disinvestment. It also means aggressive
management of reported figures responsive to the investment
community's demands for immediate value.
Enron stated its
adherence to the nonn in its Annual Report for 2000--it was a
company "laser-focused on earnings per share.,,36
Enron forces us to confront a discomfiting fact: even as
academics have proclaimed rising governance standards, some
standards have declined, particularly those addressed to the
numerology of shareholder value. The decline has not been limited to
companies subject to enforcement actions, like CendanC and
Sunbeam.38 Investigations and criticisms touch reputable names like
Xerox 39 Lucent 40 Qualcom 41 American International 42 Coca-Cola 43
,
"
"
IBM44 and GE itse1£45 The number of accounting restatements, cases
in which companies lower previously reported earnings, averaged 49
36. ENRON, 2000 ANNuAL REpORT 2 (2001).
37. See In reCendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000), aff(l, 264
F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).
38. Chad Terhune & Joann S. Lublin, Unlike Others, Dollar General Issues a Mea
Culpa, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at Bl (noting Dollar General's public apology for its
accounting irregularities in the same week that "Chainsaw" AI Dunlop paid a $15 million
settlement stemming from Sunbeam's fraudulent fmancials).
39. Claudia H. Deutsch & Reed Abelson, Xerox Facing New Pressures Over
Auditing, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9,2001, at Cl.
40. Simon Romero, Lucents Books Said to Draw the Attention ofthe S.E.C, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10,2001, at Cl.
41. John A. Byrne & Ben Elgin, Cisco: Behind the Hype, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 2002,
at 54.
42. Christopher Oster & Ken Brown, AlG: A Complex Industry, A ~1Y Complex
Company, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at C16.
43. Betsy McKay, Coca-Cola: Real Thing Can Be Hard to Measure, WALL ST. J., Jan.
23,2002, at C16.
44. WiIIiamM. Bulkeley, IBM' 'Other Income 'Can Mean Other Opinion, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 23, 2002, at Cl; Steve Liesman, Deciphering the Black Box, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2002, at Cl. The Joumalholds these companies out as exemplars of what is called "black
box" accounting. It's a black box when you can't figure it out.
45. Jeremy Kahn, Accounting in Wonderland' Jeremy Kahn Goes Down the Rabbit
Hole with GEs Books, FORTUNE, Mar. 19,2001, at 134; Rachel Emma Silverman & Ken
Brown, GR' Some Seek More Light ofthe Finances, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at Cl.
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per year from 1990 to 1997. By 2000, the annual number was up to
156.46 Clearly, the line between appropriate and inappropriate behavior
has dissolved for many under real-world pressure to produce
shareholder value. Exploitation and expansion of the gray area has
become routine. The resulting loss of perspective facilitated Enron's
step across the line to fraud. Special regulatory attention accordingly
devolves on its auditor, the actor in the self-regulatory system whose
primary function is to deter fraud.
This Article's inquiry into Enron's implications for corporate selfregulation (and the legal theory that supports it) begins, in Part IT, with
Enron's business plan. When Enron rode high, it aspired to embody
and realize the ideal of a contractual rmn rooted in the touchstone
economics of Michael Jensen and the late William H. Meckling.47
Enron would transform itself into a "virtual" corporation, a center for
market making and hedging by high-tech experts, rather than an assetheavy energy producer. Thus viewing itself as a real time nexus of
contracts, Enron looked out at the field of traditional large, vertically
integrated, asset-based companies and saw a great arbitrage
opportunity. Those lumbering behemoths with low returns on assets
were just waiting to be dismantled, their coordinative functions to be
replaced by Enron's proprietary trading markets. The strategy was
lionized in the business press in early 2001 as Skilling ascended
Enron's throne. By the year's end it was derided. Paul Krugman has
called it "death by guru"-little more than a "perfect PowerPoint
presentation:>43 It was so trendy that "few analysts were willing to fly
in the face of fashion by questioning Enron's numbers:>49
Certainly, few asked any questions. so But there may be more to
Enron's strategy than meets the eye beholding a fmn in collapse. Part
IT argues that the strategy may be restated as an application of the
Liesman, supra note 44, at C1.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EeON. 305 (1976). It is noted that
Jensen has taken the occasion ofEnron's collapse publicly to castigate managers who seek to
maximize stock prices through legerdemain rather than enhancement of fundamental value.
Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Editorial, Dare to Keep }Our Stock Price Low, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 2001, atA8. The authors have expanded their op-ed piece into a short paper. See
Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street, available at
http://www.papers.ssrn.com/abstract=297156(Feb. 17,2001).
48. Paul Krugman, Editorial, Death By Guro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2001, atA23.
46.
47.

49.

Id

50. One that did was Veba, a German firm which walked away from a proposed
merger with Enron in 1999 after Price Waterhouse took a close look at Enron's books.
Edmund L. Andrews et aI., '99 Deal Failed Mer Scrutiny ofEnron Books, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 2002, at 1.
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incomplete contracts theory of the finn that prevails in
microeconomics today. Enron failed because its pursuit of immediate
shareholder value caused it to misapply the economics. It asked for
too much from the strategy in terms of immediate increases in
earnings per share, mistaking its own inflated stock market
capitalization for fundamental value. Meanwhile, the arbitrage play it
proposed remains to be made against the prevailing pattern of vertical
industrial organization, only by a more level-headed management
team. The virtual corporation and the regulatory and social challenges
it presents remain on table.
Part ill moves on to Enron's collapse, telling four causation
stories. This ex ante account draws on information available to the
actors who forced Enron into bankruptcy in December 2001, avoiding
inquiry into the culpability ofEnron's principals. The first story looks
at Enron at the beginning of 2001 to show a company with some
profound but very conventional problems in need of solution. This
account provides a backdrop for the stories that follow. The second
story depicts Enron as Long-Term Capital Management-a derivative
play gone bad. The problem with this very good story is that even as
the allegations pile up there remains little evidence to support it. The
third story depicts Enron as a den of thieves. Here we encounter the
famous $30 million fee collected by Enron's chief financial officer,
Andrew Fastow, along with shenanigans with Special Purpose Entities.
The discussion asserts that there was no prima facie breach of
fiduciary duty bound up in the Fastow deal at the time the Enron board
approved it. At the same time, to look at Fastow and the SPE
transactions is fmally to encounter fraud, as Enron does shady deals
with its CFO's limited partnership to conceal losses and generate
earnings. Public disclosure of these activities triggers a reputational
crisis for Enron but no negative financial results large enough to bring
it down. We get those with the fourth story-the revelation of $4
billion of hidden contingent liabilities. This triggers a credit rating
downgrade, a liquidity crisis, and a ticket to Chapter 11.
Part ill accounts for these actors' behavior by reference to the
shareholder value norm and Enron's corporate culture.
More
particularly, the two stories, Part IT's story of Enron in success and Part
ill's story of Enron in collapse, combine to imply that the principals
saw themselves as players in a tournament. Their job was not just to
make money, but to make the most money-to be the superstar fIrm.
For a superstar finn, success did not mean merely doing better than the
next finn. It meant destroying the next finn and much of industrial
HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1286 2001-2002
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organization along with it and always delivering good numbers. This
single-minded pursuit of frrst-place competitive victory caused Enron's
managers to destroy their frrm.sl
Part N turns to corporate self-regulation for a conventional, but
sobering account of responsibility. To help maintain focus, attention is
limited to Enron's officers, directors, auditors, and shareholders.52
Enron's top executives and board of directors bear the primary blame.
Yet the directors went though the motions dictated by the book of good
corporate practice. Negative implications accordingly arise for the
monitoring model of the board of directors. But, despite the author's
disposition to draw regulatory inferences from business disaster, there
follows no plausible reform prescription. Secondary blame attaches to
Enron's auditors, who manifestly should have refused to give a
favorable opinion on Enron's fmancials. Here arise the case's strong
regulatory implications. It is clear that Enron had captured its auditor,
denuding the relationship of its necessary adversary aspect. Similar
situations of capture are ubiquitous in America's corporate landscape.
Secondary blame also attaches to members of the community of
institutional investors. Our self-regulatory system assumes that these
actors make a governance contribution when they monitor large
companies like Enron. Here they failed to do so even though Enron's
fmancials provided enough information about shady deals to give
them cause to demand explanations. If actors with billions of other
people's money invested do not require managers and boards to make a
coherent informational account of themselves before disaster strikes,
despite clear signs of trouble, then we must put a heavy qualification
on our reliance on the monitoring system. ill contrast, the legal system
will work as intended in this case so far as concerns ex post
enforcement, given multiple prima facie violations of the securities

51. As they did so they shed the behavior pattern of the rational actor to display the
behavioral infIrmities described in learning on securities fraud. See Kimberly D. Kra\viec,
Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 ORE. L. REv. 301 (2000);
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Dlusions: A Behavioral Theory of My Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101
(1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Dlusions]; Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope.,
Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law fiom Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Selling
Hope].
52. This leaves out a secondary list of participants, including Enron's counsel, Vmson
& Elkins, its creditors, particularly its lead lenders, and the investment institutions
participating in its off-balance sheet vehicles. They \vin receive attention enough elsewhere.
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laws and an emerging picture of widespread culpability.s3 The
disturbing thing is that the system's standing army of civil and criminal
enforcers had no deterrent effect.
Enron shows that the incentive structure that motivates actors in
our self-regulatory governance system generates much less powerful
checks against abuse than many observers have believed. This point
does not by itself validate any particular regulatory corrective. The
costs of any regulation can outweigh the compliance yield, particularly
in a system committed to open a wide field for entrepreneurial risk
taking. Such a system can no more break the iron law of risk and
return than could Michael Milken and his junk bonds. If we seek high
returns, we must discount for the risk that rationality and reputation
will sometimes prove inadequate as constraints.

II.

ENRON AND THE CONTRACTARIAN IDEAL

A.

The VIIiual Corporation

In early 2001, Enron was in a process of transfonnation,
determined to leave behind its original business, an asset-laden
producer and transporter of natural gas, to become a pure fmancial
intennediary. Its intennediary business had two aspects. First, there
was a proprietary marketplace in which Enron matched up energy
producers, carriers, and users.S4 Enron was expanding this business to
cover anything which could be traded-pulp and paper, metals, even
broadband services. There was reason for optimism-Enron had just
started up an exemplary online operation which made access to its
market cheap and user fiiendly.ss Enron acknowledged few limits to its
marketplace. Only ''unique'' products-''knickknacks''-could not be
Second, Enron sold risk
brought within its trading model.s6
management products. These over-the-counter derivative contracts
covered its customers' exposure to price risks, making participation in
Enron's market more attractive.

53. See WILLIAM: C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REpORT OF INvEsTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INvEsTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002), available at
2002 WL 198018 [hereinafter POWERS REpORT].
54.
A back-office scheduled pipeline and transmission capacity to effect actual
deliveries of gas and electricity. Zellner et aI., supra note 12, ~ 13.
55. The site is said to have handled 550,000 transactions with a notional value of
$345 billion in its first year. A Survey ofEnergy: A Bdghter Future?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10,
2001, at 57, availableat2001 WL 7317640 [hereinafter Survey: EnergJ-j.
56. OnLineExtra: Q&A with Enrons Skilling, supra note 15.
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To get a better look at Enron's intermediary operation, let us
hypothesize Enron's entry as a trader into a new market, say pulp and
paper. To effect entry as a seller, Enron fIrst had to assure itself of
sources of supply, whether through contracting or through direct
ownership of the sources of the product, here timber tracts. Once it
established itself as a seller, Enron would start bringing other sellers
together with timber buyers. As Enron saw it, such a new market
could grow spectacularly if many timber users had captive sources of
supply. In this scenario, the vertically integrated forest products
companies notice the Enron market and see that it has sufficient
volume to supply their needs. They begin to draw on it for marginal
supplies. It becomes clear that Enron's market offers timber at lower
prices than do their captive timber sources. Ultimately, these
companies unbundle themselves, selling off their forest tracts,
pocketing the gain, and relying on Enron's market for future supplies.
Enron claimed to provide a level of intelligence higher than that
of a marketplace, traditionally conceived. As claimed in Enron's 2000
Annual report: "[We] provide high-value products and services other
wholesale service providers cannot. We can take the physical
components and repackage them to suit the specifIc needs of
customers. We treat term, price and delivery as variables that are
blended into a single, comprehensive solution."s7
One key to this addition of value was diversifIcation. Enron's
network of contacts respecting supply of a given product caused a
reduction of risk for buyers of the product, a risk reduction effect
unachievable by isolated producer-sellers in an industry. Skilling
explained:
[T]he fundamental advantage of a virtually integrated system vs. a
physically integrated system is you need less capital to provide the same
reliability. . .. Nondelivery is a nonsystematic risk. If a pipeline blows
up or a compressor goes down or a wire breaks, the bigger your
portfolio, the greater your ability to wire around that.
So, if for example, I'm just starting in the gas merchant business and
I'm selling gas from central Kansas to Kansas City, if the pipeline
[between those places] blows up, I'm out of business. For Enron, if that
pipeline blows up, I'll back haul out of New York, or I'll bring Canadian
gas in and spin it through some storage facilities. If you can diversify
your infrastructure, you can reduce nonsystematic risk, which says

57.

ENRON, supm note 36, at 2.
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there's a ... very strong tangible network effect. ... But you've got to
get big, you've got to get that initial market share, or you're toase~
One obstacle to this market creation scenario concerned price risk
to buyers. Product users who procure captive sources of supply seek
insulation from price fluctuations, particularly upward price
fluctuations in times of high demand. To divest one's source of supply
and rely on a trading market, particularly another fIrm's proprietary
trading market, is to expose oneself to this risk. The solution to the
problem, for both Enron and the product user, lay in derivative
contracts entered into with a market intermediary. These can provide
protection against price increases at reasonable cost, at least for the
short and intermediate durations. Thus did Enron supplement its
activities as a market maker by entering into these contracts with its
customers. As Enron stated in its 2000 Annual Report:
In Volatile Markets, Everything Changes But Us. When customers do
business with Enron, they get our commitment to reliably deliver their
product at a predictable price, regardless of the market condition.
This commitment is possible because of Enron's unrivaled access to
markets and liquidity....
. . . We offer a multitude of predictable pricing options.
Market access and information allow Enron to deliver
comprehensive logistical solutions that work in volatile markets or
markets undergoing fundamental changes, such as energy and
broadband.59
Enron, in short, aspired to be better than a market. It was
reducing the costs of fmding, contracting with, and communicating
with outside suppliers and customers--costs that formerly meant
bringing disparate operations under a single corporate roof From this
there followed a staggering claim: Enron would apply enough raw
intelligence and superior information to the provision of products and
risk services to cause a change in the prevailing mode of industrial
organization. Said Skilling:
There's only been a couple of times in history when these costs of
interaction have radically changed.... One was the railroads, and then
the telephone and the telegraph. . .. [W]e're going through another
right now. The costs of interaction are collapsing because of the
Internet, and as those costs collapse, I think the economics of
58.
original).
59.

OnLine Extra: Q&A with Enrons Skilling, supra note 15 (alterations in
ENRON, supra note 36, at 6.
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temporarily assembled organizations will beat the economics of the old
60
vertically integrated organization.

Skilling continued, in a different setting:
The old way they reduced the risk is they'd vertically integrate. If
you were Ex.xon in the old days, you integrated across the whole
chain. . .. If you were afraid crude-oil prices would go down, you'd
own the refmery, too, because you liked it if crude prices went
down.... That made a lot of sense ... because it was very expensive to
make sure you could get reliable supplies of crude oil to go into a
refmery if you didn't own the crude oil.
Well, now you go on your computer and get it instantaneously. . .. If
you have somebody [like Enron] who comes along and says hey, look,
I'm going to virtually vertically integrate because it's a whole lot
61
cheaper, you're not going to be cost-competitive.

In Skilling's projection, virtual integration force would force Big Oil,
Big Coal, or Big Anything to split up into multitudinous micro-fIrms,
each working a niche. Enron would put the whole back together
through its trading operation, all the while securing lower prices for
all.62
The "nexus of contracts" fIrm hypothesized by Jensen and
Meckling in 1976 would be realized in fact. Jensen and Meckling
took the large fIrm and explained it as a byproduct of equilibrium
contracting by rational economic actors. Given the complexity of
relations among actors in the complex, agency cost reduction emerged
as the problem for solution in the economics of fIrm organization.63
Enron was going to use real-world market contracting to unwind
Jensen and Meckling's contractual complexes into simpler, more
transparent units. With each unit directly disciplined by the market for
its own product, agency costs inevitably would be less of a problem.
Skilling saw one further implication: assets were a bad thing to
have. This followed from the shareholder value maximization norm.
Skilling liked the numbers on return on equity capital yielded by
60. Jerry Useem, And Then, Just Men IVu Thought the ''New Economy" Was Dead,
Bus. 2.0, Aug. 200 I, at 7.
61. OnLine Extra: Q &A with Enrons Skilling, supra note 15 (fIrst four alterations
in original).
62. Survey: Energy, supra note 55. For the path-breaking discussion of the virtual
fIrm in the legal literature, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of ControL' The
Virtual Organization and Conflicting Govemance ~ctor.s-, 59 U. Pm. L. REv. 759,759-804
(1998).
63. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 310. For an explication of the theory, see
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory ofthe Firm: Critical Per.s-pectives ffom
History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1478-80 (1989).
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fmancial institutions, insurance companies, and pension funds better
than the returns capital yielded in the energy industry: "[I]t's very hard
to earn a compensatory rate of return on a traditional asset
investment. . .. In today's world, you have to bring intellectual content
to the product, or you will not earn a fair rate of return.',64 Under this
line of thinking, Enron could justifY owning a bricks and mortar
operation or other hard asset only to the extent necessary to support a
trading operation-as with the timber tracts in the foregoing example
or Enron's building of a national broadband network as the start point
for a broadband trading market. Meanwhile, Enron would divest its
extensive collection of pipelines and other properties. Wall Street
applauded-here was a fmn that "doesn't linger over troubled assets,"
dumping them in order to ''help fund its vast ambitions.,,6s
It should be noted that Enron's plan to become the real-world
embodiment of the contractarian ideal has profound implications for
industrial organization. Of course, there is nothing new about
restructuring, downsizing, and unbundling. These became everyday
events in corporate America as the shareholder value maximization
norm came to drive management decisions in the 1990s. But even as
many corporations regrouped around "core competencies" they
remained big, asset-rich entities, vertically integrating the production,
supply, and distribution functions feeding in and out of their cores.
Enron's vision held out a much more radical degree of divestiture,
leading to smaller entities under tighter market constraints and
deprived of institutional stability.
For a glimpse of the world Skilling envisioned for everybody
else, we need only look within Enron's glass box in Houston to see the
way he treated his own employees. Questions about executive
decisions were not tolerated.
Nor were fairness complaints.
Employees labored under tremendous pressure to take significant risks
and bring in favorable results in the short term. 66 And the end justified
the means. In 2000, Skilling publicly praised the employee who
started Enron's online trading operation even though she had been
explicitly forbidden to do SO.67 Said an officer present at that meeting:

64.
original).

OnLine Extra;

Q&A with Enrons SIdlling, supra note 15 (alteration in

65.
66.

Zellner et ai., supra note 12.
John Schwartz, As Enron Purged Its I?anks- Dissent Was Swept Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at Cl.
67. John Schwartz, Darth Hider. Machiavelli SIdlling Set Intense Pace., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2002, at Cl.
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"The moral of the story is, 'You can break the rules, you can cheat, you
can lie, but as long as you make money, it's all right.">6S
Enron's whiz kid recruits entered a perpetual tournament, termed
the "rank or yank" system.69 Each got to pick ten other employees to
rank his or her performance.70 But the system also allowed coworkers
to make unsolicited evaluations into an online database.71 At year's
end, Skilling threw everybody's results onto a bell curve, and those on
the wrong end of the curve were terminated.72 Those who remained
scratched and clawed to get or stay in the winners' circle.73 Wmners
got million dollar bonuses and were privileged to accompany Skilling
for glacier hiking in Patagonia or Land Cruiser racing in Australia.74
Differences between winners and losers within Enron became
starker as 2001 unfolded. All of the employees became losers as their
401(k)s gave up a billion dollars in value.7s Management froze the
plan accounts in October 2001, the same month Enron revealed a third
quarter loss of $638 million.76 Meanwhile, top executives holding
Enron stock, purchased through the stock option plan, were not
similarly restricted and continued the heavy selling in which they had
been engaged for some months. Sales of personal Enron stock yielded
Kenneth Lay proceeds of$23 million in 2001.77 Redemptions of Lay's
stock by Enron itself during the year netted him an additional $70.1
million.7$ Skilling sold $15.6 million worth before he resigned and
$15 million thereafter.79 Amalgamated Bank, the plaintiff in a lawsuit
against Enron's officers and directors, alleged gross sales of $1 billion
of Enron stock by its officer and director defendants over a three-year
period.~o

68. Id
69. Alexei Barrionuevo, Jobless in a Flash, Enrons Ex-Employees Are Stunned,
Bitter, Ashamed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11,2001, at BI.
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id
74. Seeid
75. Millon, supmnote 7, at 8.
76. Id at 9.
77. Rachel McTague, Andersen Charges Enron with Withholding Key Infonnation
Affecting Balance Sheet, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rept. (BNA) 1770 (2001).
78. Joann S. Lublin, As Their Companies Crumbled, Some CEOs Got Big-Money
Payouts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2002, at B 1.
79. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Fonner Head ofEnron Denies Wrongdoing, N.Y. TThfES,
Dec. 22, 2001, at CI.
80. Reed Abelson, Enron Board Comes Under a Stonn of Criticism, N.Y. TTh1ES,
Dec. 16, 2001, at MB4.
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We will see that Enron planted the seeds of its own destruction
with its implementation of Skilling's "asset lighf' strategy. This,
although a logical extension of the strategy-in-chief, was not necessary
for its implementation. For the core of Enron's virtual fIrm strategy,
then, the question remains: Has the strategy gone down with Enron, as
Paul Krugman has asserted, or does a valuable arbitrage play remain
on the table to be picked up by a successor?

R

Enron s Virtual Corporation and the Theory ofthe Finn

The theory of the frrm suggests that value may indeed lie in the
unbundling of vertically combined frrms. The point follows directly
from Ronald Coase's touchstone paper of 1937. Transacting on the
market, said Coase, entails costs of learning and bargaining, costs that
loom large in respect of long-term arrangements. Internalizing a
production function economizes on these costs by interposing
directions from a governance structure. But internalization carries its
own costs stemming from increased rigidity and error. The boundary
between the frrm and the market lies at the point where transaction
cost savings equal the incremental costs of rigidity and error.Sl Viewed
through the Coasian lens, Jeff Skilling's claims look almost modest.
Enron, utilizing contemporary information technology, had put
together a set of components-an information network, a derivative
product line, and online access-which drastically reduced the cost of
contracting for a range of products. Such a risk reduction causes the
frrm's boundary line to shrink and the zone of cost-effective arm's
length contracting to expand. The shrinkage does indeed imply the
unbundling of vertically integrated firms.
Coase's insight is further articulated in the contemporary property
rights theory of the frrm. This theory, like Coase's, suggests that
beneath Enron's hyperbole there may indeed lie untapped sources of
value.
Property rights theory asserts that long-term contractual
relationships inevitably are incomplete; it never will be cost effective
for parties to specify up front all future uses of productive assets.82 A
81. R.H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-95 (1937).
82. The theory puts human assets to one side, on the ground that they cannot be
bought and sold and accordingly are not among the subject matter of lInn contracts. The
lInn thus is conceived in terms of its nonhuman assets-fIxed assets, client lists, intellectual
property, and contract rights. Id; Oliver Hart, An Economists Perspective on the Theory of
the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1766-73 (1989). There is no necessary conflict between
this perspective and Enron's vision of a proprietary market generated by human intelligence,
unburdened by signifIcant fIxed assets. Enron was posing the profIle of a contemporary
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problem follows. Absent an exhaustive set of terms, a party to a
contractual relationship may be subject to a holdup-an action by the
counterparty directed to the division of the relationship's ex post
surplus.
To the extent the relationship's structure invests a
counterparty with bargaining power, the holdup diverts the surplus to
that counterparty. The theory accordingly directs its attention to the ex
post allocation of control over assets (hence the name "property
rights"). The insight is that ex post bargaining power goes to the owner
of the assets, and that the allocation of asset ownership therefore
powerfully impacts productive incentives ex ante.
For an example of the theory's operation, consider the
relationship between a Shipper (5) and a Trucker (1) hypothesized by
the economists George Baker and Thomas Hubbard. 83 S contracts with
Tfor a point-to-point haul from A to B. An additional contract will be
made for the back haul, from B to A or anywhere else, only to the
extent S needs that service at the time it makes the contract. Even if no
back haul contract is entered into ex ante it remains possible that Swill
need a back haul and will want such a contract after T starts
performing the point A to point B contract. If T starts performing the
contract \vithout a back haul contract, T will spend resources,
including time, on a search for a back haul contract during
performance of its contract with S. In addition, if Tfmds a back haul
contract and it turns out that S needs a back haul when T arrives at B,
Twill be in position to use the back haul contract to bargain with S for
a greater share of the gains on the back haul. Meanwhile, T is the
party who maintains the truck. The question is whether Tshould own
the truck or S should own the truck in a vertically integrated fIrm.
The answer depends on the facts. If Towns the truck, Tbears all
of the value consequences of decisions respecting maintenance; T
accordingly has a high-powered incentive to keep the truck well
maintained and perform hauls so as to reduce wear and tear. If S owns
the truck, it may be rational for Tto slack off on maintenance because
financial institution against that of an old economy industrial. Financial institutions are built
on assets just like industrials, it is just that contract rights and intangibles loom larger than
physical things. Control of these rights leads to effective, if not direct, control over the human
assets that make the business run. For a contrasting view of the theory of the rmn, centered
on human assets, see Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The
Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 IL. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988).
83. The discussion draws on Oliver Hart, Nonns and the Theory ofthe Finn, 149 U.
PA. L. REv. 1701,1708-12 (2001), which draws in turn on GEORGEP. BAKER & THOMAS N.
HUBBARD, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. REsEARCH, CONTRACTIBILITY AND AsSET OWNERSHIP:
ON-BOARD COMPUTERS AND GOVERNANCE IN U.S. TRUCKING, WORKING PAPER No. W7634

(2000).
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T does not bear all of the value consequences. On the other hand, if T
owns the truck, T will engage in back haul search activity, which is

costly to S even as T keeps the truck well maintained. The vertical
integration question comes down to a trade-off-the deadweight cost
to S of rent seeking by T respecting the back haul versus the
maintenance disincentives following from ownership by S.
Assume that rent seeking respecting back haul is very costly to S.
S accordingly internalizes the trucking function, and along with it the
management problem of incentivizing its drivers to minimize wear and
tear on the trucks. Now assume that Enron enters the trucking market,
creating a cheap and accessible marketplace in which carriers and
shippers buy and sell truck haul capacity. So long as maintenance
remains a problem and the Enron market offers S adequate capacity,
the Enron market easily could prove substantially cheaper than the
internally owned trucks. Divestiture therefore will make sense for S.
The Enron market lowers the cost of search for T and reduces S's
dependence on Tin the event a back haul becomes desirable to S, with
the clear result that Tshould own the truck.
More generally, property rights theory teaches that where two
assets are sufficiently complementary and contracts respecting their
deployment are sufficiently incomplete, common control dominates
over separate ownership. Extreme complementarity obtains when, as
between assets separately owned by two actors, neither actor can profit
from increased output of either asset unless she has access to both; that
is, absent the other asset, each is useless.84 In that case, integration is
the only way to produce. Contrariwise, where complementarity is not
extreme, a given asset by defInition can be used for different purposes.
Vertically to integrate a fInn owning such an asset with another fInn
requiring only a subset of the possible uses, is potentially to sacrifIce
value. Since the owner-manager of the acquired fIrm loses ownership
rights, there is a diminished incentive to invest in the asset on the part
of those responsible for deploying the assees Generalizing, as a fInn's
operations grow away from a core of complementary assets, there arise
increasingly severe incentive problems respecting the peripheral assets.
Productivity decisions at the periphery will tend to be directed in the
interest of the core, a species of holdup.
At this point the theory yields a presumption against integration.
Because integration in a large organization increases the number of
84. Hart, supra note 82, at 1770. Separate ownership only creates opportunities for
holdUps. Id
85. Id at 1767-68.
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potential holdups, absent significant gains from complementarity,
nonintegration tends to be more productive than integration.86 Emon's
business plan built on this latter point. The sudden appearance of a
cheap and reliable trading market where none existed previously
reduces complementarities among assets across the economy.
But universal unbundling does not necessarily follow. It all
depends on particulars respecting costs in the case. As an example,
consider a result yielded by Baker and Hubbard's trucking study. Their
survey of the industry shows that 18 in need of back hauls resort to a
thin spot market managed by brokers, and that rent seeking by 18
respecting back hauls is very costly to SS. Meanwhile, the introduction
of computer trip monitoring technology made it possible for Ss to draft
incentive contracts with drivers that substantially ameliorate incentive
problems respecting maintenance of Sowned trucks. In the market
described by Baker and Hubbard, then, technological innovation
caused the cost balance to tip toward intemalization.87 This, of course,
still leaves open the possibility that the introduction of a more efficient
market for trucking capacity could shift the balance back.
In addition, it should be noted that complementarities among
assets expand as investment in assets becomes relationship specific.
Here consider the famous example of General Motors (GM), which
manufactured cars, and Fisher Body, which manufactured car bodies, a
principal componenes The two firms became integrated after a period
of relational contracting, in which Fisher proved unresponsive to GM
demands for stepped-up production. Could Emon have solved their
problems with an online market for car bodies? That would depend on
numerous technical and cost factors. GM and Fisher became involved
in a problematic relational contract because GM needed bodies
manufactured according to its own specifications, which manufacture
required a considerable start-up investment on the part of its supplier.89

86. Id at 1770.
87. See Baker & Hubbard, supra note 83.
88. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropdable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 IL. & EeoN. 297 (1978).
89. In order to be induced to make the investment in the production facility, Fisher
required a long-term purchase commitment from GM. The contract needed a price term that
prevented GM from squeezing Fisher down to its variable costs after the costs were sunk.
Fisher accordingly got a ten-year requirements contract, which priced the bodies on a costplus percentage basis, protecting GM from price gauging by Fisher. But then Fisher turned
the tables on GM. A run-up in demand made it rational for GM to want Fisher to invest in a
new plant. A new plant would mean a lower cost per unit. But that investment made no sense
to Fisher, which would make more money producing with its old equipment at higher cost
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Once the supplier makes the investment, there results a significant
complementarity. Nothing about a cheap, online business-to-business
market guarantees the existence of products meeting particular
specifications or of incentives to make buyer-specific investments.
Additional, intrinsic limitations on the Enron model should be
mentioned. Enron's promise to provide the product over time at a
predictable price can be fulfIlled only to the extent that derivative
hedges cost-effectively can insulate against price fluctuations. Such
insulation comes cheapest on a short-term basis. Transaction costs go
up as the duration extends to an intermediate term. Derivative
protection on a long-term basis comes at a much more substantial cost.
Such innovative, long-term contracts did figure into Enron's business.90
But as yet we have no performance track record for them, so their
viability as a substitute for ownership remains to be proven.91 The
upshot is that the Enron trading market was not yet a perfect substitute
for vertical ownership. To the extent that a long-term price
commitment is material, vertical integration still could dominate.
Finally, consider Oliver Hart's point that the greater the quantum
of trust in the environment, the more actors can be expected to use the

under the cost plus fonnula. Finally, GM bought all of Fisher's stock. Klein, supmnote 82,
at 200-02.
90. See The Fall ofEnron: How Cold It Have Happened?: Hearings Before the
United States Senate Comm. on Govemmental Affairs, 107th Congo (2002), at
http://www.senate.gov/-gov_affairs/012402partnoy.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002)
[hereinafter Enron Hearings] (providing testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law,
University of San Diego School of Law).
91. Long-tenn derivative contracts implicate substantial problems of valuation.
There also can be liquidity problems. Consider in this regard the story ofMetallgesellschaft
(MG), a large Gennan company, that went to the brink of bankruptcy in 1994 following a
misconceived hedge. The fInn had sold a series of nonderivative, long-tenn, fIxed-price
delivery contracts for oil. These contracts resulted in a long-tenn exposure to a rise in the
price of oil. MG only partially hedged this risk with long-tenn derivative purchase contracts,
which trade in a thin market and tend to be illiquid. It made up the gap by buying short-tenn
oil futures contracts and rolling them over every three months. The strategy behind this "false
hedge" was as follows. For some years, short-tenn oil prices had been higher than long-tenn
prices, and the two had moved up and down together. On this price pattern, a rise in prices
would result in profIts in the short-tenn futures market that covered MG's losses on its longtenn forward contracts. But it did not work out that \vay. The price pattern broke abruptly
when OPEC failed to agree on production cutbacks in the fall of 1993. Short-tenn prices fell
sharply, causing MG losses on the short-tenn positions. MG attempted to unwind the shorttenn positions and shift to long-tenn hedges. But traders in the thin long-tenn market
awaited it and the long-tenn price rose slightly. What had been modest profIts on the hedge
became a series of large losses, said to amount to $1.2 billion. See Richard C. Breeden,
Directors, Control}vur Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at A14; Metallgesellschafl:
Not So Clever, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 1994, at 83, 83.
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market and stay separate.92 The credibility of Enron's projections of a
disintegrated future depended on a strong assumption about the
trustworthiness of the substitute marketplace. It therefore appears that
Enron's collapse does bear importantly on the credibility of predictions
of future vertical disintegration. Enron's market was not a free public
space in which buyers and sellers came together to transact directly
with one another. It was instead an intermediary space owned and
controlled by a single corporate entity. Such a market's viability as an
alternative to ownership entirely depends on the corporate proprietor's
fmancial health, validated by an investment-grade credit rating. Any
buyer or seller materially relying on the existence of an Enron product
market got a rude shock when Enron lost its credit rating due to
concealed ill-health and tumbled into Chapter 11 two weeks later.
The foregoing analysis introduces some significant qualifications
to the notion of the virtual firm. It thereby deflates Enron's pumpedup vision of micro companies tied together by a single giant corporate
intellect. But it does not at all rebut the suggestion that we could see
significant disintegration beyond the 1990s practice of corporate
unbundling.

m.

ACCOUNTING FOR ENRON'S COLLAPSE-FoUR STORIES

A.

Enron as Conventional Market Reversal

Enron's results for 1998, 1999, and 2000 suggest some interesting
comparisons. The firm's revenues increased by $10 billion from 1998
to 1999, and by $60 billion (to $100 billion) from 1999 to 2000.
During the period, revenues contributed by Enron's old economy asset
businesses-its pipelines and water companies-stayed stable. The
revenue growth93 came from Enron's new economy trading business.
Meanwhile, net after-tax income rose much more slowly, as the chart
below shows. Pre-tax profits (not depicted on the chart) increased by
$1 billion in 1998, and then by only $500 million in each of 1999 and
2000. These simple horizontal analyses suggest declining returns in
92. Hart. supra note 83, at 1710. It is noted that Hart shows that the point is not an
absolute; on some scenarios trust favors a large organization. Id at 1711-13.
93. Even with this simple point-the statement of revenues-there is a little bit of
smoke and mirrors in the financials. Enron's spectacular revenue growth stemmed from the
fact that when it effected a transaction, it followed the energy industry pmctice of booking the
entire contmct sale price as a revenue, instead of booking only its commission-accounting
like a retailer mther than a broker-dealer. The cost to Enron of commodities tmded are
booked as expenses. The growth of expenses, termed "costs of gas, electricity, metal and
other products," accordingly was just as spectacular as the growth of revenues-from $34.7
million in 1999 to $94.5 million in 2000. See ENRON, supra note 36, at 31.
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the trading business.94 More particularly, even as Enron had opened
more and more new trading territory, entrance barriers were low. As
time went on, Enron had to deal with dozens of competitors who hired
away its employees to compete in what had become its bread-andbutter business, undercutting its profit margins. According to one
analyst, Enron's trading margins collapsed from 5.3% in early 1998, to
1.7% in the third quarter of 2001.95 Investor attention to the problem
was deferred for a time because the California energy crisis and the
attendant period of sky-high electricity prices led to extraordinary
returns to all traders in that market. As California's prices dropped
back to normal, Enron's shrinking trading returns became more
apparent. 96
ENRON STOCK PRICEIREVENUES/EARNINGS

(Source: Enron Annual Report 2000)
HIGH

Low
12/31 CLOSE
REVENUE

1996
23
17
22
13.2

1997
22.5
17.5
21
20.2

1998
29
19
29
31.2

1999

44
28
44
40.1

2000
90
41
83
100.7

493

515

698

957

1,266

($MILLIONS)
NET INCOME
($MILLIONS)

Enron's managers saw that rapid maturation of its new markets
presented a problem for its growth numbers. Their strategy for dealing
with it was to step up the process of market creation, moving into new
commodities like pulp and paper, steel, and, most daringly, bandwidth.
In addition, in 1999 they successfully launched EnronOnLine, an
Internet-based commodity trading platform. But these initiatives did
not make up for the shrinking returns in Enron's bigger volume energy
trading business. And there was another problem. Good as they were
at opening markets, Enron's managers were less adept at the old
economy discipline of cost control.97 Indeed, extravagant spending was
an everyday incident of life at the fmn.98
94.
95.

Special Report, supra note 28, at 61-62.
Id
Jenkins, supra note 12.
Bill Keller, Editorial, Enron for Dummies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, atA15.
Neela Banerjee et aI., At Enron, Lavish Excess ODen Came Before Success, N.Y.

96.
97.
98.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at Cl.
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Bandwidth emerged as a special problem. Enron had invested
$1.2 billion to build and operate a fiber optic network. m 2001, it
found itself with an operation with 1700 employees that devoured
$700 million a year with no sign of profitability. These numbers
emerged just as severe overcapacity and fmancial distress hit the
broadband business as a whole. The negative implications for Enron's
stock price far outstripped the drain on cash flow. According to some
outside analysts, when Enron's stock peaked in August 2000, priced at
ninety with a price earnings ratio of sixty, a third of the price stemmed
from expected growth in the broadband-trading operation.99
Old economy-related factors also contributed to Enron's
problems.
A number of big-ticket investments abroad-most
prominently, the $3 billion power plant in Dabhol, mdia, a $1.3 billion
purchase of the main power distributor to Sao Paulo, Brazil, and the
$2.4 billion purchase of the Wessex Water Works in Britain-all were
performing badly. These global mistakes were adding up in public
view. 100
Finally, Enron's managers, "laser-focused" on earnings as they
were, had to keep an eye on its portfolio of "merchant investments."
This contained many large block holdings of stock in technology and
energy companies. Many of these positions were illiquid; hedges were
Enron accounted for these
either expensive or unavailable. 101
investments as trading securities. Under this treatment, unrealized
increases in the stocks' prices had flowed through to its income
statement as gains. I02 Thus had the rising stock market benefited
Enron's numbers. A falling market would have the opposite effect,
however.
The combination of the foregoing conditions and the stock
market's general decline caused Enron's stock to fall precipitously even
before resignations and scandals beset the company. The stock lost
99. Zellner et aI., supra note 3, at 34-35.
100. Id at 32. In mid-2000, Enron came close to dumping the lot in a sale to a group
of wealthy Middle Eastern investors for a tidy $7 billion. Unfortunately, the deal aborted.
David Barboza, Enron Sought to Raise Cash Two Year.sAgo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2002, at Cl.
A contract to sell Enron's interest in Wessex Water has been entered into the Chapter 11
proceeding, netting $777 million in cash. Suzanne Kapner, Enron Selling Wessex ~ter for
$777 Million, N.Y. TU\1ES, Mar. 26, 2002, at C13.
After Enron's banlauptcy filing, it was alleged that Enron officers, seeking to protect its
net earnings totals, point blank refused to write-off expenses booked as assets in overseas
projects that had manifestly failed. Kathryn Kranhold, Enron Disputes Investors' Charge of
Manipulated Cost Accounting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,2002, at B7.
101. See POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 77-92.
102. HERwl1Z & BARREIT, supra note 8.
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thirty-nine percent of its value in the fIrst six months of 2001.103 Had
Emon gone into Chapter 11 at this point in the story due to these
factors (taken together with a recession), the story would be
umemarkable. The distress would stem from garden variety risks and
problems faced by all fmns. Such failures bespeak erroneous business
judgment and bad luck on the part of managers, but present no policy
problem for business regulation. Emon captures our interest because
these causes were necessary but not sufficient for its collapse, at least
on the present state of the record. 104

R

Enron as Derivative Speculation Gone Wrong
As we have seen, risk management through derivative contracting

was a central component of Emon's trading business. These risk
management services imply risks to the service provider. Emon nicely
described these in its 2000 Annual Report:
Wholesale Services manages its portfolio of contracts and assets in
order to maximize value, minimize the associated risks and provide
overall liquidity. In doing so, Wholesale Services uses portfolio and
risk management disciplines, including offsetting or hedging
transactions, to manage exposures to market price movements
(commodities, interest rates, foreign currencies and equities).
Additionally, Wholesale Services manages its liquidity and exposure to
third-party credit risk through monetization of its contract portfolio or
third-party insurance contracts. Wholesale Services also sells interests
in certain investments and other assets to improve liquidity and overall
return, the timing of which is dependent on market conditions and
management's expectations of the investments' value....
The use of fInancial instruments by Enron's businesses may expose
Enron to market and credit risks resulting from adverse changes in
commodity and equity prices, interest rates and foreign exchange
rates. !Os

The last sentence just quoted makes a critical point respecting the
risk profIle of fmns that deal in derivatives. The degree of risk
103. Zellner et aI., supra note 3, at 33.
104. The assertion in the text assumes that Enron's balance sheet and income
statement figures respecting its trading and energy production operations were fundamentally
sound. The assumption could turn out to be heroic. Analysts are already starting to ask
questions. One, for example has been comparing numbers reported in regulatory filings with
numbers Enron claimed to be generated by Enron OnLine, noting a huge discrepancy.
Gretchen Morgenson, How 287 Tumed Into 7: Lessons in Fuzzy Math, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2002, at MB 1.
105. ENRON, supra note 36, at 23, 28 (Management's Discussion and Analysis) .

•
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exposure depends on whether the "rocket scientists" in the fInn's
derivatives department fully or partially hedge their positions.
Anything other than full hedging can mean a loss (or windfall gain) in
the event of price volatility. Management's Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) in Enron's 2000 Annual Report makes a state-of-the-art
governance assurance:
Enron manages market risk on a portfolio basis, subject to parameters
established by its Board of Directors. Market risks are monitored by an
independent risk control group operating separately from the units that
create or actively manage these risk exposures to ensure compliance
with Enron's stated risk management policies. 106
What Enron's "stated risk management policies" actually said
was not disclosed. Some observers of Enron's fall suspect that,
whatever the "stated policy," the practice might have been imprudent.
More particularly, they hypothesize that Enron's derivatives traders had
been pumping up its earnings with bets that energy prices would rise.
Such bets would have meant signifIcant profIts in 1999 and 2000. 107 In
2001, however, such betting would have meant signifIcant losses as
energy prices fell.lO s On this scenario, Enron's fall mimics the 1998
case of Long-Term Capital Management, with two differences. Here
the high-tech bets were on energy prices rather than on interest rates,
as there, and here there was no bailout engineered by the Federal
Reserve, as there.
Others press a different, but concomitant, derivative story. They
allege that Enron's trading floor was a nest of corruption. The traders,
it is said, routinely overstated their own trading profIts, impelled no
doubt by the tournament system's demand for good numbers. The
traders also abused the fair value accounting that now applies to their
operation. Under this, some derivative positions are "marked to
market" (MTM) each reporting period. Under MTM accounting, even
though the position remains open and gain or loss has not yet been
realized, the frrrn's income statement reflects the gain or loss implied
by the contract's current value. For over-the-counter derivatives, no
trading market sets this fIgure. The contract's value must be derived
106. Id at 27 (Management's Discussion and Analysis).
107. Professor Partnoy offers an analysis ofEnron's income statement showing that ail
of its profits for its last three years came from derivatives. Enron Hearings, supra note 90,
PartID.C.
lOS. Enrons Fall: Upended, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1,2001, at 65; Michael Schroeder &
Greg Ip, Out ofReach: The Enron Debacle Spotlights Huge Void in Financial Regulation,
WALL ST. 1., Dec. 13,2001, at AI.
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from an economic model.
Unfortunately, generally accepted
approaches to valuation did not yet exist for many items in Enron's
vast stock of innovative derivative products, particularly those with
longer terms. An opportunity for income statement legerdemain
109
resulted, and it is alleged that Enron's traders took liberal advantage.
Similar accounting treatment,110 along with similar problems of
speculative valuation, applied to Enron's long-term energy trading
contracts. Here Enron aggressively exploited a special rule procured
by the energy industry. Under this, the fInn books estimated gains for
the lives of long-term supply contracts on a present basis, rather than
spreading the recognition of revenues over the lives of such contracts
as would be done under conventional accounting. Indeed, it now
appears that Enron marketed these and similar transactions to potential
counterparties, selling accounting and tax treatments along with
energy and fmancial products, with the treatments importing more
111
substance than the transactions themselves.
If some or all of the foregoing allegations turn out to be trueand many have turned out to be true already-then derivatives trading
very well may have brought Enron down in 2002 or thereafter. But in
2001, when Enron fIled for bankruptcy, none of the foregoing was
known to the fmanciers and related actors who determined Enron's
fate. Strictly speaking, then, a malfunctioning derivatives operation
did not bring Enron down. 112 Whether the lion's share of these
allegations prove out remains to be seen. 113
A cautionary, counterfactual note enters the story nonetheless:
Even ifEnron's derivative positions were appropriately managed, many
observers were ready to believe the company to be a candidate for
derivative distress in light of the direction of energy prices in 2001.
Given that distress stemming from other quarters would make it
difficult for Enron to maintain its credit rating and liquidity, and thus
109. Enron Hearings, supra note 90, Part ill.C.
110. See Emerging Issue Task Force (EITF) Issue 98-10: Accounting for Contracts
Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.
Ill. See David Barboza, Enron Offered Management Aid to Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2002, at Cl.
112. Cf.Michael Schroeder, As Enron sDedvatives Trading Comes Into Focus, Gap in
Oversight Is Spotlighted, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at C1 (noting Professor Partnoy's
testimony and noting the absence of oversight, but citing no corroboration of the allegations).
113. It bears noting that in January 2002, UBS Warburg purchased Enron's energy
trading operation from the Chapter 11 debtor in possession, implying a judgment of
soundness. On the other hand, that deal involved a contingent consideration. Daniel Altman,
New Economy: Many Think that Enron s Business Model for VntuaJ Trading Remains
Sound Despite the Companys Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at C4.
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its relationships with contract and derivative counterparties, suspicions
respecting derivatives exposure could not have helped matters. Enron's
famously opaque fmancials only fueled suspicions.
If Enron's derivative operation turns out to have been corrupt,
there arise two powerful regulatory implications.
First, the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act should not have exempted
Enron and similarly situated fIrms from oversight. 1I4 Second, the
achievement of transparency respecting derivative positions for all
fmancial intermediaries should take fIrst place on the federal
regulatory agenda.
C.

Enron as a Den ofThieves

Disclosures of self-dealing transactions in the fall of 2001
seriously destabilized Enron. The disclosures concerned a complex of
side deals involving two limited partnerships of which Enron's CFO,
Andrew Fastow, was the manager of the general partner. These
arrangements put $30 million into Fastow's pocket, and resulted in an
overstatement of Enron's earnings over four years of at least $591
million. I IS This Part starts with some accounting, laying out basic rules
governing parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, and other entities and
showing how those rules created problems for Enron's middle
managers as they worked to realize Skilling's vision. The Part goes on
to the Fastow arrangement and the $30 million and fmally turns to
earnings manipulation.
1.

Accounting Rules and Chewco's Phantom Equity Investor

Enron listed more than 3000 affiliated entities in its 1O-K.,
variously accounting for them as consolidated subsidiaries, equity
affiliates, and Special Purpose Entities (SPEs).
When one fInn owns a majority of the stock of another fInn, the
accountants require the two fInns' fmancial statements to be
consolidated. The two fInns' income numbers are combined and a
common balance sheet shows all assets and liabilities. Transactions
between the two fInns drop out and do not generate revenues for either
fIrm's income statement. Enron had many such subsidiaries. But
subsidiaries did not fIgure prominently in Skilling's "asset lighf'
114. The Act should be amended to remove the ''Enron Poinf' in any event.
115. The number comes from an Enron SEC filing. Bigger numbers now circulate.
The Powers Committee would later suggest that $1.1 billion is a more accurate figure for the
overstatement respecting the Fastow partnerships. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 127-28.
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restructuring program. Enron had to minimize the amount of debt
appearing on its balance sheet in order to preserve its credit rating.
The viability of its trading and derivatives operation depended on an
investment grade endorsement. Accordingly, when Enron sought to
enhance returns on an equity investment through heavy leverage, it
made sure it owned less than a majority of the investee company. It
had such fIfty percent (and under) investments in an array of hardasset companies, which it termed "equity affiliates." Accounting for
these stock holdings proceeded under the "equity method." Under
this, the investee's fmancials are not consolidated; the investee's debt
accordingly does not appear on the stockholder's balance sheet. On
the other hand, intercompany transactions drop out and cannot
generate revenues for either firm's income statement. Finally, the
stockholder company shows a pro rata share of the investee's earnings
on its income statement. 1l6
A third accounting category permits a corporation to set up an
unconsolidated affiliate and transact with it so that the profIts from the
transactions do flow through its income statement-the qualifIed
Special Purpose Entity. SPEs tend to be high-leverage shells. The
party in Enron's position (the "transferor" or "originator") transfers a
fmancial asset to the SPE in exchange for consideration other than
equity in the SPE. The SPE can raise the consideration for the asset
transferred in any number of ways. If the asset has a rock-solid
payment stream, it can borrow the consideration from a third party or
in the public markets. It also can raise substantial outside equity
capital. If the asset's creditworthiness is dubious, outside borrowing is
precluded. But the SPE still can return its own debt paper to the
originator. Multitudinous Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) rules apply, mainly focused on the nature of the sales
transaction between the originator and the SPE.1I7 There is also a
critical SEC rule-three percent of the SPE's total capital must come
from an outside equity investor,118 who must in addition have the power
116. See HERWITZ & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 524-27.

117. A statement of the current accounting rules are set out in Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial
Asserts and Extinguishment of Liabilities (Mar. 2001). The previous rules are set out in
SFAS No. 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishment of Liabilities (June 1996).
118. The three percent test is an SEC accounting rule. It originated in a 1991 letter of
the Chief Accountant of the SEC issued in respect of a leasing transaction. The GAAP
authorities are EITF Topic D-14: Transactions Involving Special Purpose Entities; EITF 9015: Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in
Leasing Transactions; EITF Issue 96-21: Implementation Issues in Accounting for Leasing
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to control the disposition of the asset in the SPE. 119 This means that the
outside equity holder must hold at least a majority of the SPE's
equity:20 In addition, the outside equity holder's capital must be "at
risk"-the originator cannot guarantee the investment's results. 121
Finally, a legal determination as to the ''banlauptcy remote" status of
the SPE from the transferor also must be made. 122 This all may sound a
little sinister, but respectable fIrms use SPEs every day as vehicles for
off-balance sheet securitization of fmancial assets such as accounts
receivable and loan portfolios. In the case of accounts receivable, the
transferor fIrm lowers its borrowing costs.l 23 In the case of a loan
portfolio, the transferor fIrm gains liquidity and an opportunity to
diversify its investments.
Enron used Fastow's limited partnerships as means to stay in
compliance with the SPE rules. Fastow's entities served as the outside
equity investor-the source of the qualifYing three percent-for SPEs,
which served no economic purpose other than to pump-up Enron's
accounting earnings. As to entities such as these, arm's length outside
equity investors understandably can be hard to fmd. The famous
Chewco SPE, which preceded the Fastow limited partnerships in $TIe
and later fIgured independently in the Enron accounting scandal,
illustrates the problem.

Transactions Involving Special Purpose Entities. The SEC insists that there is no bright line
three percent test and that the level of outside funding should follow from the nature of the
transaction. See David A. Kane, Remarks at the 28th Annual Conference on Current SEC
Developments (Dec. 4, 2000) (on file with Tulane Law RevieW). The profession appears to
treat the standard as a numerical rule, however.
119. Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, FASB, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot ofthe Comm. on Energy and Commerce 9-10 (Feb.
14, 2002), available athttp://www.fasb.org/news/testimony.pdf(last visited Aug. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Jenkins Testimony].
120. Id If the equity participation is minimal-at the three percent level-then it must
own 100% of the equity.
121. Id
122. ERNST & YOUNG, FINANCIAL REpORTING DEVELOPMENTS: ACCOUNTING FOR
TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL AsSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIESFASB STATEMENT 140, at 135-37 (2001).
123. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to SecuritizeAssets,
11 CARDOZO L. REv. 607, 607-13 (1990). There is a policy debate respecting these
transactions. The originator lowers its borrowing costs only so long as the SPE is
''bankruptcy remote." Some argue that this imports an inappropriate priority to the SPE
lenders to the detriment of preexisting contract creditors and all tort creditors of the
originator. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations ofSecuritization, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1055, 1055-1120 (1998) (discussing securitization and bankruptcy law);
Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061,
1077-1111 (1996)(same).
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Back in 1993, Enron set up a joint venture in energy investments
with Calpers, the California state pension fund. It was called Joint
Energy Development Investments (JEDI). In 1997, Skilling wanted
Calpers to enter into an unrelated investment arrangement with Enron.
Calpers was willing, but only if it fIrst was cashed out of JEDI. A
direct purchase by Enron of Calpers' fIfty percent equity stake in JEDI
was not an option. That would have meant turning JEDI into a wholly
owned subsidiary ofEnron whose debt would have to be consolidated
on Enron's balance sheet. JEDI was heavily levered-its debt amounted
to $1.6 billion by 1999:24 To avoid that result, Enron formed an SPE,
Chewco, and used Chewco to buyout Calpers. Chewco borrowed the
money and Enron guaranteed the 10an. l2S Between 1997 and 2001, the
Chewco arrangement permitted Enron to recognize $405 million of
revenues and gains respecting transactions with JEDI and Chewco. 126
Everything would have been fine except for one little compliance
problem. Enron had never gotten around to rmding the three percent
outside equity investor needed to qualify Chewco as an SPE. The
Powers Report tells a sordid story here. Skilling wanted the Calpers
takeout closed so quickly that Enron's middle managers had to fund
Chewco's "equity" with a secret loan from Enron. A continued search
for an equity investor after the Calpers closing proved fruitless. In the
end, a sham transaction was constructed and concealed both from
Enron's board and its auditor, Arthur Andersen. The transaction took a
bank loan through some entities run by an Enron officer, Michael
Kopper, and disguised the loan as an $11 million equity investment in
Chewco. 127
The arrangement came to light within Enron in fall 2001,
disqualifying its previous accounting treatment of Chewco and JEDI.
DisqualifIcation in fall 2001 meant consolidation of JEDI and Cheweo
124. Some of the purchase price paid by Chewco also may have come from a loan by
JED! itself John R. EmshwiIIer, Enron Transaction Raises New Questions, WALL ST. 1., Nov.
5,2001, atA3.
125. Id

126. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 42; see also John EmshwiIIer, Andersen CEO
Apparently Testified Inaccurately, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 11, 2002, at A4.
127. See POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 41-47. Chewco became a limited partnership with Michael Kopper as the general partner and Big River Funding LLC as the limited
partner. The sale member of Big River was Little River LLC, of which Kopper's domestic
partner was the sale member. Id at 47. How this was supposed to get control of Chewco
away from Enron is anybody's guess. The $11.4 million loan was from Barclay's Bank.
Although called a "funding agreemenf' yielding a "certificate:' the substance was clearly that
of a credit arrangement. Id at 50; see also John R. EmshwiIIer & Rebecca Smith, Joint
venture: A 1997Enron Meeting Belies OJJicers' Claims They Ui're in the Dark, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1,2002, at AI.
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with the result that Enron's earnings for 1997 through mid-2001 were
retroactively reduced by $405 million. 128 Meanwhile, consolidation
increased its total indebtedness by $628 million. This was not the only
such disqualification to occur in fall 2001. 129
Another JEDI transaction which came to light later should be
mentioned. JEDI owned twelve million Enron shares, which it
accounted for as trading securities. Unrealized gains on the stock thus
flowed through to JEDI's income statement. Enron, accounting under
the equity method with the approval of Andersen, then flowed fifty
percent of that unrealized appreciation on its own stock over to its own
income statement. In the fIrst quarter of 2000, Enron bootstrapped its
way to $126 million of revenue this way. But in 2001, when Enron's
stock fell, no corresponding deductions flowed through!130 This was
not the only way Enron used its own stock as a means to generate
paper earnings.
2.

Fastow's $30 Million

In 1999, Andrew Fastow organized two limited partnerships, LJM
Cayman, L.p. (LJM1) and LJM2 Co-Investment L.p. (LJM2). The
entities were formed to participate as the outside equity investor in
SPEs set up by Enron. Fastow controlled LJM1 and LJM2, serving as
the managing member of their respective general partners. J3J The
arrangement involved an obvious conflict of interest. Enron would be
doing transactions with entities controlled by its own CFO. But there
was a justifIcation. LJM1 and LJM2 promised to solve the
compliance problem that had led to the under-the-table dealings
respecting Chewco. \32 At the same time, with Fastow in charge,
transactions could be set up and executed smoothly and quickly. LJM1
and LJM2 were funded with outside equity-a long list of fmancial
institutions contributed around $390 million in exchange for limited
partnership interests and a representation that these entities' privileged
status meant the best Enron deals. The investors included IP. Morgan,
Chase, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, First Boston, and Wachovia;

128. POWERS REpORT, supm note 53, at 42.
129. Enron Form 8-K, filed Nov. 8,2001, § 2.B.
130. POWERS REpORT, supmnote 53, at 58-59.
13!' With LJM2 there were two tiers of general partners between Fastow and the
limited partnership. Id at 73-74.
132. The Powers Report questions whether an adequate separation of control ever
really was achieved. Id at 75-76.
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employees of Merrill Lynch (which had marketed the interests) also
kicked in $22 million. '33
A scandal resulted when the terms of the transactions between
Enron and the SPEs in which LJMl and LJM2 made the three percent
equity investments were :fully disclosed to the public in October 2001.
An analytically distinct problem arose for Enron with the disclosure
that Fastow had raked in $30 million from compensation arrangements
respecting his management of the limited partnerships. The SEC
launched an investigation on October 22. Fastow got the sack two days
later. He has since retained David Boies. '34
The vociferous reaction to Fastow's self-dealing suggests a
tentative explanation of Enron's failure centered on a loss of
confidence. An old economy, hard-assets rIrm can weather this sort of
disclosure by causing heads to roll and bringing in heavyweights from
outside to clean up. Enron, however, had ceased to be a hard-assets
company. Its survival depended on its trading operations, the success
of which required trust and confidence among Enron's counterparties.
The scandal in the wake of the self-dealing disclosure amounted to an
external shock to the structure of confidence Enron had erected over
many years. The rIrm went down with the structure, much like Drexel
Burnham Lambert's'35 collapse of a decade ago in the wake of the
proceedings against Michael Milken.
This neat story gives rise to a number of questions. First, LJMI
and LJM2 and Fastow's role in them were not exactly news in the fall
of 2001. They had been disclosed in footnote 16 of Enron's 2000
rmancials. Now, this disclosure was not a model of clarity. Fastow is
not mentioned by name and the paragraphs offer only a scattershot and
cursory description of the dealings back and forth. But the types of
transactions between Enron and the LJM-related SPEs are clearly
stated, along with the magnitude of the numbers involved. '36 Footnote
16 reports:
(a) that Enron had transferred to the LJM-related SPEs more than
$1.2 billion in assets, including millions of shares of Enron common
133. John R. Emshwiller et aI., How Wall Street Greased Enrons Money Engine,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,2002, at Cl.
134. Enron's board went into the time-honored crisis mode and appointed a special
committee of outside directors. This was led by William Powers, the Dean of the University
of Texas School of Law, appointed to the board for the occasion. The committee thereinafter
retained Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and Deloitte & Touche for legal and accounting advice.
Enron Fonn 8-K, supra note 129, § 4.
135. Also an Arthur Andersen client.
136. ENRON, supra note 36, at 48; seealsoENRoN, 1999 ANNuAL REpORT 59 (2000).
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stock and long-term rights. to p-Ufchase millions more shares, plus $150
million ofEnron notes payable;
(b) that the SPEs had paid for all of this with their own debt
instruments with a face amount of $1.5 billion; and
(c) that the SPEs had entered into derivative contracts with Enron
with a notional amount of $2.1 billion. 137
One has to turn to Enron's 2000 proxy statement to see Fastow
identified. The proxy statement discloses that Fastow will be
remunerated by a "percentage of the profits ... in excess of the general
partner's proportion of the total capital contributed to [the partnership]
depending on the performance of the investments made."138 No actual
numbers are given, but we are told
(a) that "management believes that the terms ... were reasonable and
no less favorable than the terms of similar arrangements with unrelated
third parties;' and
(b) that actors other than Fastow negotiated the transactions for
Enron. 139
Enron's November 2001 Form 8-K adds that Enron's board had
reviewed the matter of Fastow's affiliation and determined it not to be
injurious to Enron's interests. Continuing controls were imposed-each
LJM transaction had to be approved by the Chairman and two
additional top officers, and the Audit Committee was to conduct an
annual review. 140
The Powers Committee report on LJM1 and LJM2, released in
February 2002, later would establish beyond peradventure that the
transactions between Enron, the SPEs, LJM1, and LJM2 involved
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by Fastow and others to Enron.141
Terms of many sales contracts were skewed to favor LJM (and thus

137. ENRON, supmnote 36, at 48.
138. Enron Schedule 14A, filed Mar. 21, 2000, at 26.
139. Id at 25-26.
140. Enron Form 8-1(, supmnote 129, § 5.A.
141. The most outrageous occurred in connection with the termination of LJM!.
Fastow caused the "termination interests" to be directed to a partnership called Southampton
Place. As a partner, Fastow made $4.5 million over two months based on a negligible
investment. Two other Enron officers made $1 million each. POWERS REpORT, supm note 53,
at 16. Those involved in the Southampton caper and still with the company on November 8,
2001 were fired that day. Enron Form 8-1(, supmnote 129, § 7.
Fastow had sold his interests in LJM! and LJM2 in July 2001 to Michael Kopper.
Unlike Fastow, Kopper resigned from Enron in connection with his purchase of the interests.
Enron Form 8-1(, supm note 129, § 5.A; see also Joann S. Lublin & John R. Emshwiller,
Enron Boards Actions Raise Liability Questions, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 17, 2002, at Cl.
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Fastow's equity interest). As a resWt of this, returns to LJM's outside
equity investors were quite fantastic. 142
But no one knew any of this on October 17, 2001, when the only
news was the fact that returns to Fastow amounted to $30 million.
Given that previous disclosures held out the possibility of a significant
upside possibility for Fastow, why all the brouhaha? As a matter of
corporate law, deals like this do not breach fiduciary duties on a per se
basis. 143 If we follow the Delaware cases, the disinterested directors'
approval means that a plaintiff seeking to make out a breach of the
duty of loyalty has to bear the burden of showing that the transactions
were unfair. l44 Unfairness obtains only if Fastow's $30 million was out
of line with the returns of managers of comparable limited
partnerships, or if plaintiff could show that the terms of the
transactions between Enron and LJM unduly favored LJM. ill October
2001, neither situation obtained on the face of the public record. 145
Given the large numbers involved in the Enron-LJM SPE transactions
and a practice of large rewards for promoters of private equity
schemes, a fmding of fiduciary breach respecting the $30 million
taken by Fastow would have seemed unlikely, absent Enron's other
problems.
We can draw several lessons from the fact that, despite all of this,
disclosure of the $30 million taken alone caused a scandal. First,
contrary to the efficient market hypothesis,146 actors in the fmancial
142. See. e.g., POWERS REPORT, supra note 53, at 103-04 (discussing returns on LJM2).
143. However, many, including the author, think they should. For a discussion of the
Delaware law implications of Enron, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact, Some Early
Reflections on the Corporate Law Implications of the Enron Debacle (2002) (working paper,
on file with author).
144. See Cooke v. Ooli~ No. 11,134- (DeL Ch. June 23, 1997),23 DEL. J. CORP. L.
775 (1998). Enron is an Oregon corporation. Cooke is referenced because it interprets a
statute worded very similarly to OR. REv. STAT. § 60.361 (1999), which governs self-dealing
transactions.
145. Much is made of the fact that LJM2's marketing materials asserted that, because
of the insider tie, LJM2 would get the best Enron SPE transactions. See Henriques &
EichenwaId, supra note 8, at MB 1.
It is noted that Fastow, in one presentation on LJM, represented that partnership matters
took up only three hours of his time per week. ErnshwiIIer & Smith, supra note 127, at AI.
146. The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis asserts that all information is
incorporated into the stock price; the semi-strong form asserts that the price reflects all
publicly disclosed information. VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 128-30 (4th ed. 1993). Even in descriptions of market
pricing that acknowledge considerable departures from efficiency, it is generally thought that
stock prices are particularly likely to be accurate given a thick trading stock and a large
market capitalization, both of which obtained with Enron. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket EfJiciency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 622-26 (1984). Of
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markets are selective so far as concerns assimilation of facts rendered
in fme print sections of fmancials and other SEC documents. Second,
the strength of the norm against self-dealing brought to bear in the
fmancial community varies with corporate results. On the upside, no
one pays much attention. The operative norm is that of the corporate
law duty-self-dealing transactions are acceptable so long as the
consideration stays in the same ballpark as that of comparable
transactions. Since everyone is making money, magnanimity makes
sense. Disturbing the side deal could destabilize a productive
employment arrangement. 147 On the downside, everything is different.
The same officer touted as an entrepreneurial genius on the upside
starts to look like a thief and his or her self-dealing transaction causes
a scandal even though it already was disclosed.
This could be called scapegoating. It is defensible nonetheless.
The officer who succumbs to temptation on the upside assumes the
downside risk of reputational ruin. The fmancial community and the
law only tolerate self-dealing transactions as a matter of expediency.
Beneath that tolerance runs a strong norm of aversion which can rear
its head viciously in bad times. Neither Andy Fastow nor any other
self-dealing corporate actor plausibly can express surprise when a
spate of red ink triggers his or her denunciation as a miscreant. Legal
liability easily could follow: The transaction that did not breach the
duty of loyalty when entered into in good times can breach the duty by
virtue of the fact that unrelated subsequent events make it look unfair
to an ex post decision maker.14S
course the $30 million figure was new, but the previously disclosed facts implied such a
figure, at least to an audience of sophisticated investors.
147. See Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447,
455-56 (Iowa 1988) (concluding that self-dealing contracts costing more than comparable
contracts were not unfair because they incentivized a successful entrepreneur).
148. There is also a lesson here for the corporate law academics who have debated
back and forth the question whether fiduciary constraint of self-dealing transactions should
continue to be mandatory or should be downgraded to contractual status as a liability regime
into which corporations opt in their charters. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1434-48 (1989) (arguing for
opting out ,vith process controls), uith Jeffrey N. Gordon, Thr;: MandatOlY Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1593-97 (1989) (arguing that contract failure is
probable with broad brush opting out of fiduciary duties). Unfortunately, Enron's case will
not end the argument It instead raises two conflicting inferences. On the one hand, the
vehemence of the ["mancial community's imposition of the norm against Fastow suggests that
contractual treatment may suffice. Such a deeply and widely held aversion to self-dealing
arguably needs no support from a mandatory legal regime. The reputational ruin awaiting
those who traverse the norm should more than suffice as a deterrent. On the other hand,
Enron's demonstration of the norm's power supports the mandatory regime. If there were no
,videly held norm against self-dealing, mandatory fiduciary liability would be of dubious
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To sum up on Fastow and his $30 million, this previously
disclosed self-dealing transaction, taken alone, makes an implausible
candidate for a leading role in an account ofEnron's collapse. For that
we must look to the broader terrain ofEnron's dealings with its SPEs
and affiliated companies.
3.

SPEs and Overstated Numbers

The confidence-based account of Enron's collapse becomes more
compelling with a closer look at transactions between Enron and the
SPEs related to LJM1 and LJM2. 149
a.

The Watered Stock

Recall that Enron funded the LJM-related SPEs with $1.2 billion
of its own common stock, along with other assets, exchanged for debt
instruments of the SPEs. A century ago, corporate law barred such
transactions, prohibiting the use of debt or other promissory
consideration in connection with the issue of new common stock. ISO
The risk that insiders would take the stock and ertioy an upside play
without ever delivering on their promises was deemed great enough to
support a per se prohibition. Today corporate law has a more relaxed
attitude, remitting the decision as to the adequacy of the consideration

legitimacy. Indeed, given charter competition's historical role in assuring that legislatures
remove outmoded mandates from corporate codes, the self-dealing mandate already would
have disappeared from the law if it lacked normative support. Meanwhile, the norm makes it
implausible to contend that the ancillary costs of fiduciary litigation carry no compensating
benefit-vindication of the norm is a benefit. Finally, just as the norm imports substantive
support for the mandate, so does the mandate support the norm, serving as a backstop
enforcement mechanism. No more than a backstop appears to be needed-empirical studies
of corporate law litigation show that only a very small number of shareholder derivative
actions are brought in respect of self-dealing transactions. See Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. EeoN. & ORG. 55, 58-60, 84 (1991)
(showing small numbers of derivative actions). Of course it can be argued that these small
numbers merely show the norm's independent prohibitive force. But that point just as easily
can be modified so that the small numbers are seen to stem from the combination of the
norm's power and the certainty of enforcement against violators.
149. Only with the Powers Report, supmnote 53, did the public get a complete record
of these transactions. The description in Enron's 2000 Annual Report was unhelpful. The
details that led to a scandal and contributed to Enron's bankruptcy were set out in Enron's
corrective filings with the SEC in November 2001. The famous letter to Lay written by
Enron vice president Sherron Watkins also discussed these transactions. Text ofLetter to
Enrons Chainnan After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at C6
[hereinafter Watkins LetteIj.
150. See BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 41-42 (2d ed.
1981).
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to the discretion of the board of directors. lSI Accountants retain a
healthy suspicion: Notes received in exchange for a company's own
common stock must be booked as deductions from shareholders'
equity.ls2 The newly issued stock is credited to the capital stock
account at the purchase price, but the capital stock accounts elsewhere
are debited (reduced) in the amount of the note. The result is a wash at
the time the note is issued. As the note is paid, the reduction gradually
is reduced, with a corresponding net increase to the shareholders'
equity account!S3
Such niceties, however, did not fall within the purview ofEnron's
aggressive accounting practices. When it capitalized the LlM-related
Raptor I-N SPEs, Enron booked the notes issued by the SPEs as
assets on its balance sheet and increased its shareholders' equity in a
like amount, as one would do when selling newly issued common
stock for cash in a public offering. Enron and Andersen later thought
better of the treatment. Unwinding it meant the sudden and highly
embarrassing disappearance of $1.2 billion from Enron's net
shareholders' equity!S4
Significantly, the matter at least had been mentioned in the
footnotes to Enron's 2000 fmancials. We see the stock going into the
SPEs, and then some sentences later we read of "a special distribution
from the Entities in the form of $1.2 billion in notes receivable."lss

151. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.21 (b)-(c) & cmt. 1 (discussing board of
directors' determination of adequacy of consideration for shares).
152. EITF Issue No. 85-1: Classifying Notes Received for Capital; SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 40, Topic 4-E: Receivables from Sale of Stock; 17 C.ER. Part 211 B
(2002); seea/soJenkinsTestimony, supmnote 119, at 22.
153. Say stock is issued in exchange for a $1000 note payable. At issue the following
entries are made in the shareholders' equity section:
Note Receivable from Issue of Shares
$1000
Capital Stock
$1000
When the Note is paid, two entries follow:
Cash
$1000
Note Receivable from Issue of Shares
$1000
The net result is an increase in cash and an increase in equity, but it is permitted only after the
Note is paid. GAAP extends this skepticism to accounting for all speculative debt paper,
under the installment and cash recovery methods. See HERwITZ & BARRETI, supm note 8, at
494-97.
154. Enron Form 8-K., supmnote 129, § 3. See also Powers Report, supmnote 53, at
125-26, which notes that Andersen was ready to deem the mistake immaterial.
155. ENRON, supm note 36, at 48.
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The Equity Swaps that Weren't

Enron used the LJM-re1ated SPEs-Talon and the Raptors IN-as counterparties in equity swaps.IS6 The swaps hedged Enron's
exposure to downside risk on large block positions of publicly traded
equity it held in its "merchanf' portfolio. Enron needed hedges of
these exposures to protect its income statement. Because the stocks
were accounted for as trading securities, any unrealized decreases in
their market values were deducted from Enron's net earnings. So far
so good: It is normal for holders of large, undiversified equity stakes,
such as executives holding sizable positions in their own companies'
stock, to enter into such contracts. Ordinarily this is done with a
financial institution for a short or intermediate term. To describe a
very simple transaction, if the stock subject to the swap goes up during
the period of the swap, the executive pays the bank the amount of the
price increase. Because the executive's own block of stock has gone
up as well, the transaction is a wash so far as the executive is
concemed. 157 If the stock goes down, the bank pays the amount of the
decrease to the executive. The bank in turn hedges its downside risk
on the stock by selling the stock short or purchasing a put option on
the stock. 158
The LJM-related SPEs acted in the position of the fmancial
institution. But they did not make hedging contracts to cover their
exposure in the event the stock subject to the swap lost value. Such
contracts would have been expensive if available at all. Instead, the
Enron common stock (issued in exchange for the SPE notes) used to
fund the SPEs was to cover any SPE loss on the swap.
The Enron portfolio stocks under the swap did lose value. Enron
set up the swaps just as the subject stock prices hit peaks. According
to the Powers Report, the value of the portfolio under the swaps fell by
$1.1 billion across five fiscal quarters, so that the SPEs owed Enron
$1.1 billion under the contracts. Enron, using the new "fair value"
accounting, marked the value of its rights under the swap contracts to
156. The account in the text draws on Emon Form 8-K, supra note 129, § 5.A, Sherron
Watkins' Letter to Lay, Watkins Letter, supra note 149, and the Powers Report, supra note 53.
157. In the real world, the executive may swap for the return on some other investment,
for example the return on a market portfolio such as the S & P 500 or a portfolio of bonds.
158. Shorting the underlying stock means borrowing shares to cover the position. In
order to borrow the shares, the short party must provide collateral, which will be cash. The
party lending the shares and holding the cash collateral pays interest on the cash, at rate
slightly under LIBOR. The bank pays this interest over to its swap customer, but at an even
lower rate, pocketing a spread (around thirty basis points, depending on the customer). This
in effect is the bank's fee.
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market for income statement purposes. Enron's reported numbers are
lower than the later Powers figures: Enron's Annual Report for 2000
showed a $500 million gain on the swap contracts, which exactly offset
its loss on the stock portfolio. This $500 million made up about one
third ofEnron's earnings for 2000 (prior to restatement in 2001).
Problems arose. The Enron common stock used to fund the SPEs
with capital to support the swaps also started falling. Where its value
fell below the SPE's exposure on the swap, the SPE was technically
insolvent. There resulted a series of improvised restructurings of the
transactions, carried out by Enron's middle managers and concealed
from its board of directors. 159
Worse, the whole transaction structure followed from a very
faulty premise. The stock protected by the swaps was not going to go
back up. The SPEs had not hedged, so that, under the deal, their losses
on the stock would have to be covered by the stock issued by Enron.
Collapsing everything into one transaction, Enron was issuing its own
common stock to itself to cover its own income statement loss, thereby
increasing its own net earnings over the life of the swaps by a total
figure in excess of $500 million ($1.1 billion according to the Powers
Report).
This one may not do under the most basic rules of accounting,
indeed, under the most basic rules of capitalism. One issues stock to
raise capital. One then uses the capital to do business and generate
income. One cannot skip this step and enter the capital stock directly
into income. The value of a firm stems from its ability to take the
capital and earn money over time; its stock market capitalization
reflects projections of its ability so to do. Here Enron perverts the
system, using its market capitalization-the value of its common
stock-to support the value of its common stock.
At Ken Lay's direction, Enron folded the SPEs and the swaps in
the third quarter of 2001, restating past earnings downward by almost
$600 million. It had at least noted the arrangement in the footnotes to its
2000 Annual Report. The Report tells us of the hedges, and we see that
Enron owes the SPEs "premiums" totaling $36 million. Further, "Enron
159. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 98. In one particularly egregious arrangement,
Enron's middle management had no Enron stock available to fund the SPE. Instead of going
to the board to get more authorized, they funded the SPE with a block of the same stock being
hedged by the swap. Needless to say, the SPE became insolvent rather quickly when the
stock went south. Id at 114-15. The stock in the SPE was that of The New Power Company,
an Enron startup slated to market power directly to consumers. The enterprise flopped rather
badly. See Rebecca Smith, Short Circuit: How Enron s Plan to Market Electricity
Nationwide Fizzled, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, atAl.
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recognized revenues of approximately $500 million related to the
subsequent change in the market value of these derivatives, which offset
market value changes of certain . . . investments:,160 However, we are
not told how the SPE will be covering its $500 million loss exposure.
Nor are we told why "premiums" were due and owing. It took
the Powers Report to clear that up. Fastow negotiated a deal for LJM
that guaranteed a windfall profit out of each SPE even before a single
swap was put in place. The SPE would write a put on its Enron
common stock and sell the put to Enron. Enron would pay a premium
on the put at the market rate for such a contract. The SPE transferred
the premium to LJM as an immediate return on capital. For example,
with LJMl and the Talon SPE, this was a $41 million payment,
making for a 193% annualized return on the LJM investment. 161
ENRON-THE COURSE OF EVENTS, 2001 162
DATE 2001
January 1
February 12
March 26

STOCK
PRICE
83.12
79.80

April 17

60

May 5
August 14
August 15

59.78
43
40.25

October 15
October 16

33.17
33.84

Event

Skilling named CEO
LJM transactions restructured;
Chewco closed out
First quarter profits of $536
million announced
Skilling resigns
Sherron Watkins delivers letter to
Lay
Third quarter loss of $618 million
announced

160. ENRON, supm note 36, at 48.
161. POWERS REpORT, supm note 53, at 103-04. The Powers Report also shows
numerous additional earnings manipUlations carried out through LlM-related SPE
transactions. Enron transferred fmancial assets to the SPE at prices favorable to Enron right
before the expiration of a fiscal quarter. In many of these cases, the SPE would later transfer
the asset back to Enron at an assured profit. Id at 128-44. A family resemblance to the real
estate flips of Charles Keating and the Lincoln Savings & Loan is noted. See Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 905-19 (D. D.C. 1990).
162. Robert L. Bartley, Editorial, Enron: First; Apply the Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
2002, at A23; Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, U&b ofDetails Did Enron In as
Wamings U&nt Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2002, at 1; EmshwiIIer, supmnote 124, at
A3.
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DATE 2001
October 17

STOCK
PRICE
32.20

October 17
October 17

32.20
32.20

October 18

29.00

October 22
October 24
October 25

16.41
16.35

October 31
November 8

13.90
8.41

November 9

8.63

November 19

9.06

November 28

0.61

November 28
November 30
December 2

0.61
0.26
0.40

c.

1319

Event
Rumors of $1.2 billion equity
write-off circulate on Wall Street
401(k) plans frozen
Wall Street JoumaJ reports Fastow
rake of $30 millionl63
Wall Street JoumaJ reports the
$1.2 billion write off
SEC launches investigation of
Enron accounting
Fastow terminated
Merger discussions with Dynegy
commence
Form 8-K fIled; reveals LJM and
Chewco earnings write-offs
Dynegy
merger
agreement
executed and delivered
Form 10-Q fIled; reveals hidden
guarantees, cash flow crisis
S&P downgrades Enron to junk
status
Dynegy cancels merger
Chapter 11 filing

Summary

At around the same time Enron revealed the aforementioned
downward restatements of its previously reported results, Enron
announced a 2001 third quarter loss of $618 million (compared with
around $300 million profits a year earlier). Just looking at the
numbers for the year 2000, the downward adjustment due to LJMrelated entries was $519.9 million, a significant number in view of the
fact that Enron's restated net earnings for 2000 amounted to only $847
million. I&! The problem went beyond the numbers, which were not
163. John Emswhiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate
Big Loss, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 17,2001, at Cl.
164. Enron Form 8-K, supra note 129, § 2.
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large enough to bring down Enron, taken alone. The terms of the
transactions showed that Enron had been pumping up its earnings by
abusing the SPE device. Whenever economics had gotten in the way
of a result it wanted, it had used its own high-flying common stock to
surmount the sticking point. On the upside this might pass; with the
stock falling through the floor this meant trouble. Even worse, Enron
no longer had any credibility-no one can believe anything asserted by
a firm that covers up losses by entering into sham derivative contracts
with itself 165
It is possible that the credibility deficit in time could have
brought down the firm.l66 As to that we can only speculate, for
independent reasons brought about Enron's collapse before the
implications of its SPE accounting could be assimilated fully.
D.

Enron as a Bank Run
As a part of Skilling's "asset light" strategy, Enron had moved

hard assets worth billions into affiliated entities. Many were majority
owned by Enron and consolidated into its fmancials, some of these
even having their own credit ratings. Many more were unconsolidated
affiliates accounted for under the equity method. We have seen that
with its SPEs Enron could divest itself of fmancial asset, even as it
needed to sell only a relatively small stake to outside equity investors.
With Enron's unconsolidated affiliates, bigger outside equity stakes
were required.
But why would smart money from the financial community
commit significant money as Enron divested junk assets? Leverage
appears to provide a good working explanation. Enron wanted to
realize as much cash as possible from its asset divestments. So in
165. Enron's securities plaintiffs will be putting this earnings management together
with stock sales by Enron's officers and directors to depict a classic "pump and dump"
operation.
166. More SPE shenanigans have come to light since the Chapter 11 filing.
"Braveheart" is the most notorious. Enron transferred its interest in a joint venture with
Blockbuster (to use Enron's broadband to sell movies directly to consumer subscribers),
which never got off the ground, to an SPE called Braveheart. The SPE bought the right to
receive the first ten years of project revenues. A Canadian bank loaned the $115 million
purchase price to the SPE, ,vith Enron guaranteeing the revenue stream. With Enron
bankrupt, the Canadian bank is now left holding the bag. Enron booked a $11 0 million profit
on the sale, netting the negative assumed value of the guarantee against the purchase money.
The transaction arguably conforms to GAAP. Keller, supra note 97, atAl5; Floyd Norris &
Kurt Eichenwald, Fuzzy Rules OfAccounting and Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl;
John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Murky ~teJ:S": A Primer on Enron Partnerships,
WALL ST. 1., Jan. 21, 2002, at Cl.
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many cases Enron and its outside equity turned to outside lenders to
provide debt capital for the equity aiIiliate. Had the aiIIliates
borrowed nonrecourse to Enron, these deals would not have threatened
Enron's stability.
But it seems that in many cases outside lenders were unwilling to
lend on the credit of the junk assets Enron was dumping into its equity
aiIiliates. They insisted that Enron itself be liable on a contingent
basis. As an example, the debt of Marlin Water Trust, an aiIiliate
through which another aiIiliate, Atlantic Water Trust (in which Enron
had a one-third equity interest) invested in a company called Azurix
Corp., a joint venture that owned a water works in Britain. Marlin was
capitalized with $125 million in equity and $915 million in debt.
"Trigger events" in its debt contracts provided that Enron would
become liable on its debt if either Enron lost its investment grade
credit rating or its common stock price fell below $59.78. If either
trigger went off, Enron had ninety days to register and sell sufficient
common stock to pay down the debt. To the extent Enron did not raise
the cash to pay the debt with a stock offering, Enron was obligated to
make up the difference in cash. 167 Similarly, Enron had backed $2.4
billion of debt of another equity aiIiliate, Osprey, with a contingent
promise to issue Enron equity, and ultimately to assume the debt,
should the value of the stock prove inadequate. l6S
The Marlin and Osprey debt obligations show us why Enron's
house of cards fmally collapsed. As Enron transferred hard assets
from its balance sheet into the affiliates, it sought cash consideration
for the assets rather than dodgy debt paper issued by the aiIiliate.
Some cash would come in from outside equity participants, but not
much. The affiliates had to be levered in order to attract private equity,
which would accordingly be putting up only a small fraction of the
value of the assets purchased. Significant cash consideration for the
assets therefore meant outside lenders. To swing deals in the private
placement debt market, Enron gambled on the price of its own highflying stock. If the stock remained buoyant, the obligation to pay the
debt came due only on the debt's maturity. At that time, the stillbuoyant stock would provide a painless vehicle for paying off the debt
167. Enron Form lO-Q, filed Nov. 19,2001, Part I, Item 1.
168. The Marlin/Osprey arrangements were pioneered by Enron together with
investment bankers from Citigroup, Credit Suisse, First Boston, and Deutsche Bank. Some
then sold similar arrangements to other energy companies, such as EI Paso Corporation and
the Williams Companies, which also wished to divest junk assets. See Patrick McGeehan,
EnrOll s Deals T~re Marketed to Companies by Wail Street, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,2002, at Cl.
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should the value of the affiliate's assets fall short. IfEnron's stock fell
gradually and caused the trigger to go off, Enron could get out from
under the debt by minting more stock. It would have a problem on
only one scenario. If the triggering stock decline was a free fall, Enron
would be unable to bail itself out with a new stock offering and the
debt would be accelerated directly against it. It was the last scenario
that actually occurred.
Here was high-leverage financing in a mode that the promoters of
the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s never would have dared to imagine.
The 1980s deals were old economy deals, in which lenders looked to
the earning power of hard assets and took mortgages and security
interests in the assets. 169 New economy company that it was, Enron
borrowed on a virtual basis: It took on contingent obligations secured
in the first instance by its own market capitalization and incurred for
the purpose of divesting itself of its own assets. In the 1980s, a highly
leveraged deal presupposed a projection that the company would
generate earnings before interest and taxes sufficient to cover the debt.
At Enron in the virtual 1990s, the value to back the deal came not from
such an inside projection of what the firm could earn, but from the
market stock price. Stock prices also result from future earnings
projections-projections made by outside traders with limited
information about the company. Sometimes, in runaway stock
markets, the projections are dispensed with entirely as the traders
chase trends.
Unfortunately, Enron took this gamble on its own stock price in
such a bubble stock market. And so the gamble failed. As we have
seen, Enron's stock declined for independent reasons as 2001
unfolded. This, together with the crisis in confidence triggered by the
SPE disclosures, caused further price declines. Contract contingencies
began to trigger obligations on billions of off-balance sheet debt. And,
in a conjuring trick unimaginable to the principals of Drexel Burnham
Lambert in their most creative moments, Enron had incurred these
contingent liabilities without bothering fully to disclose them in its
financial statements, whether on the balance sheet or in the footnotes.
Indeed, it delayed public disclosure until the last possible point-midNovember 2001.
169. There is, however, one notable point of commonality. In the more risky 1980s
deals, the lenders looked less to the hard assets of the borrower than to spreadsheets showing
upward growth projections for the borrower's cash flows. Enron, when borrowing against its
own common stock, was borrowing on the assumption that rmancial reality lay behind the
heroic growth projections implied by a price earnings ratio of si.""<ty.
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The sudden appearance of $4 billion of additional obligations
struck Enron with more devastating effect than would have been the
case with an old-fashioned, hard assets company.170 Enron already was
frantically trying to prop itself up with new borrowing,171 including a
$1.5 billion infusion from its partner in a bailout merger, Dynegy.172
Dynegy, on hearing of the $4 billion, immediately insisted that the $9
billion merger price be reduced to $4.17 billion. At the same time,
analysts reckoned that Enron needed $4 billion of immediate cash
from somewhere to sustain its trading operation. But no cash was
forthcoming. Enron's trading business melted away; in the last weeks
almost all of its volume stemmed from unwind orders from parties
going elsewhere. Dynegy waited a week after learning of the $4
billion, and then called off the deal. This happened just after Standard
& Poors, having concluded that there would be no rescue, downgraded
Enron to junk status. 173 Enron had nowhere to go but the Chapter,
where it ended up in a few days' time. It was, as erstwhile CEO Jeff
Skilling later observed, a "classic run on the bank.,,174 No wonder he
had bailed out in AUgust. 175
Skilling's description is apt. Enron had come to look more and
more like a fmancial intermediary, whether a bank or a broker-dealer.
Such businesses depend on customer confidence. As we have seen,
Enron already was looking less than confidence-inspiring by October
2001. But a fmancial intermediary's customers do not necessarily care
170. The list of hidden obligations kept growing. The components of the $4 billion are
broken down in Enron's Form IO-Q, supmnote 167, Part I, Item 2. When Standard & Poor's
downgraded Enron's debt to BBB- on November 12, the downgrade by itself triggered $1.6
billion of contingent equity affiliate liabilities to due and owing status (including, on a beltand-suspenders basis, some already triggered, like the Marlin borrowings). Standard &
Poors, focusing on Enron's unsuccessful foreign investments, had put Enron on notice of its
concerns about the credit rating in June. Enron talked it out of a downgrade. ZeHner et aI.,
supmnote 3, at 32. The collapse ofEnron's stock price triggered an additional $3.1 billion of
obligations, $700 million of these in connection with a derivative contract. In addition, one of
Enron's principal credit facilities contained a "material adverse change" clause that also was
triggered by the downgrade. Oppel, supm note 79, at C3. Jeff Skilling argues that such a
clause is unusual in such a contract. Id In a form similar to that of a merger upset condition,
he may be right. But conditions with similar cut-off effects are standard in debt contracts.
What is hard to imagine is how a bank could sign a contract that required it to continue
lending in the face of a sudden fifty percent increase in the borrower's long-term debt.
171. It had to exit the commercial paper market in November. Enron Form IO-Q,
supmnote 167, Part I, Item 2.
172. Id
173. John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corpomte veiL· Behind EnroD S Fall, A
Culture ofOpemting Outside Public s Wew, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at AI.
174. Oppel, supm note 79, at C1.
175. See Coy et aI., supm note 4, for a quote from an unnamed senior Enron employee
to the effect that Skilling understood the mess he had created and resigned for that reason.
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about earnings management and executive self-dealing transactions so
long as their own contracts are perfonned to the letter. Here
"confidence" in the fIrst instance means creditworthiness signified by
an investment grade rating, particularly when the intennediary does
business in derivative transactions. (That is why banks do this
business through special purpose subsidiaries with independent credit
ratings.) To lose the rating is to lose the derivatives business, as
counterparties take their business risks to a shop able to enter into
derivative contracts entailing no significant default risk.
As with the watered stock and the equity swaps that weren't, a
good part of the story of the hidden liabilities was there to be gleaned
in Enron's 2000 Annual Report. Although many affIliates and SPEs
were unconsolidated, the magnitude ofEnron's asset transfer program
was apparent. Of the $23.4 billion of "Investments and other Assets"
reported on its balance sheet, $5.3 billion (22.6 percent) represented
investments in ''unconsolidated equity afIIliates.,,176 Footnote 9 shows
that these entities' liabilities exceeded that of Enron-they had a total
of $4.7 billion current liabilities, $9.7 billion long-tenn debt, and
$6.148 billion of "other noncurrent liabilities.,,177 We also see clearly
on Enron's income statement that its percentage share of affiliate
earnings (accounted for under the equity method) could impact its
bottom line signifIcantly. In 1999, this fIgure was $309 million,
34.6% ofEnron's net earnings of $893 million. The fIgure fell to $87
million in 2000, 8.8% of that year's reported $979 million of operating
178
net income.
179
Enron's cash flow statement also presents interesting numbers.
Proceeds from sales of "merchant assets;' which in Enron's accounting
scheme generate operating earnings, in 2000 generated $1.8 billion of
cash and $1.3 billion of "unrealized" noncash gains. Again there is a
176. ENRON, supra note 36, at 32.
177. Id at 42.
178. Id at 31. Disclosures respecting the contributions to Enron net earnings of the
proceeds of transfers offmancial assets to SPEs are murkier. Enron reports $541 million of
extraordinary gain on asset dispositions in 1999 (60.6% of net income of$893 million) and
$146 million of such gain in 2000 (14.9% of net income of $979 million). Id But Enron
does not tell us how much of those figures represent sales to SPEs. It does give us reason to
suspect that they do represent such sales when both of these figures are backed out of the
operating cash flow section of Enron's cash flow statement, signaling a sale of assets for a
paper consideration. In 2000, the trading and derivative operation generated $1.63 billion of
income before interest and taxes, while "sale of asset" activities generated $889 million of
such income. Id at 23. In the light of hindsight, both numbers, and particularly the latter,
would be more meaningful if transactions with SPEs had been broken out separately.
179. Id at 34.

HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1324 2001-2002

2002]

DARK SIDE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE

1325

signal of a sale for paper rather than money. Enron's statement of
investment cash flows also makes interesting reading. Of $4.3 billion
invested, $933 million is "equity investments."
Two paragraphs above all in Enron's 2000 MD&A stand out in
light of hindsight. They disclosed the contingent affiliate liabilities
and triggers:
Enron is a party to certain fmancial contracts which contain
provisions for early settlement in the event of a significant market price
decline in which Enron's common stock falls below certain levels
(prices ranging from $28.20 to $55.00 per share) or if the credit ratings
for Enron's unsecured, senior long-term debt obligations fall below
investment grade. The impact of this early settlement could include the
issuance of additional shares of Enron common stock.
. .. Enron's continued investment grade status is critical to the
success of its wholesale businesses as well as its ability to maintain
adequate liquidity. Enron's management believes it will be able to
maintain its credit rating. ISO

The paragraphs omit at least two material facts-that the "fmancial
contracts" are affiliate debt contracts and derivative contracts
unconsolidated on Enron's balance sheet and that Enron's contingent
liabilities under the "provisions" amount to $4 billion, a figure which
looms large in comparison to the $1.7 billion of short-term debt and
$8.55 billion of long-term debt booked on Enron's 2000 balance
sheet!~1 Belated disclosure of the $4 billion total in November 2001
was by itself sufficient to bring down the finn.ls2
180. Idat27.
181. Id at 33. A highly diligent reader of the fmancials might have flipped twentyfive pages further on in the fmancials to fmd a half-way disclosure: A $213 million entry for
"guarantees" added to total debt. A further check of a footnote states an assumption of ten
percent probability ofiiability, implying a total of$21.3 million of obligations. Id at 52. But
this $20 million appears to be a separate category relating to letters of credit, discussed in
footnote 15. Id at 48.
182. When Enron, as Chapter 11 debtor in possession, first met with its creditors it
reported a balance sheet debt of $22 billion as of November 16 (and total debt of $39.71
billion). Mitchell Pacelle et aI., Enron Has One-Year Restructuring Target, WALL ST. 1, Dec.
13,2001, atA3. Some of this additional debt appears to have been with respect to a swap that
involved payment up front to Enron by the bank counterparty of the notional amount; Enron
was to repay that sum over five years. Enron received $3.9 billion of such hidden loans from
1992 to 2001. Off-balance sheet accounting apparently accorded with GAAP. Daniel
Altman, Enron Had More Than One U1ly to Disguise Rapid Rise in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2002, at 1. Other hidden debt stems from transfers of natural gas purchase contracts
among Enron, an offshore subsidiary, and IP. Morgan Chase. Sale and purchase contracts
would be matched, with Enron getting a prepayment for natural gas under the sale contract
but not making a prepayment in connection with the matching purchase contract. When it
was netted out, Enron had an intermediate term loan from the bank, which was accounted for
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Summary andAnalysis

All four of the preceding stories figure into the final account of
Enron's collapse. Had Enron suffered no reverses in its basic business
and no crisis of confidence, the contingencies respecting the $4 billion
of obligations that pushed Enron into Chapter 11 might never have
occurred. At the same time, had $4 billion of additional obligations
not come out of the woodwork after Enron entered into a merger
agreement with Dynegy, the merger might have been consummated.
We can pare down the account by coupling the crisis of confidence
and the hidden $4 billion of obligations as primary causes. The
coupling works well-both stories involve equity affiliate and SPE
transactions incident to Skilling's "asset lighf' strategy and aggressive
earnings management. Both stories also involve heavy use of Enron's
common stock as a back-up currency importing stability to an
otherwise shaky deal structure.
Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the equity affIliate and SPE
transactions appear foolish, reckless, or fraudulent. There arises a
question as to just what the top officers of Enron thought they were
doing. Clearly, they pursued much more than the realization of
Skilling's promise of higher return on invested capital through
divestment of hard assets. Short-term stakes loomed larger. Viewed in
the short-term, Enron's asset sales to SPEs generated revenues and
gains that helped Enron's net earnings meet market expectations
during the interval prior to the realization of earnings from Enron's
new investments. IS3 Had the fmancial assets sold to the SPEs been sold
for cash to third parties at arm's length, they still would have been a
source of funds. But one suspects that the net earnings impact of arm's
length sales would have been much less favorable. It accordingly
made perfect sense to put Fastow on both sides of the SPE transfers.
His divided loyalty assured a purchase price pitched to Enron's bottom
line, even as his limited partnership solved the Chewco problem and
stood ready to serve as three percent outside investor. At the same
as a sale. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Hid Big Loans, Data Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002,
at Cl; Kurt Eichenwald, Questions Raised on Enron Offshore Gas Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2002, at Cl. Enron made a similar arrangement with a Connecticut utility, now an
unsecured creditor in its bankruptcy. See Paul Zielbauer & Michael Brick, Connecticut Feels
Fallout From Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,2002, at Cl.
183. Studies show that when growth stocks report even small earnings shortfalls, the
resulting stock price declines are disproportionately large. For a summary of the literature,
see Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the
Wews ofAccounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCTNG. HORIZONS 235,
245-46 (2000).
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time, Enron used its equity affiliates as a source of debt capital. This
borrowing helped the afIiliates yield attractive returns for their outside
equity investors (and presumably to provide a source of funds for new
investments in the push to expand trading markets). Deflecting highleverage equity investment to the afIiliates made perfect sense for
Enron because it had to limit direct borrowing in order to maintain the
investment-grade credit rating on which its trading business depended.
The equity afIiliate strategy hit a snag only with the terms
imposed by the outside lenders. They wanted security beyond that
afforded by the afIiliates' assets. Enron's managers responded with a
gamble and borrowed against their own stock price. This reflects a
belief in their own business plan. They must have figured that the
stock price eventually would become bulletproof once the fInn was
awash in earnings from broadband and other new initiatives. The same
projection fIgured centrally in the LJM-related SPE derivative strategy.
In the interim period before the new investments paid off, the sham
equity swaps supported earnings per share. Had its stock price stayed
buoyant, Enron might have covered the SPE's losses on the derivative
contracts with all eyes remaining averted from the economic substance
of the transactions. The decision to stay silent about the magnitude of
contingent obligations similarly fIgured into the gamble. Had the
stock price stayed up, the only downside on the borrowing was an
incidental dilution of the common stock interest. And had the stock
stayed up, the strategy might have worked. Unfortunately, with the
stock price falling and Skilling pulling out of the company with no
explanation, investors and reporters started to ask questions. l84
So, what now seems foolish, reckless, or fraudulent, does so only
because the gamble failed. Of course, gambling is what high-risk
high-return businesses are all about. Rarely, however, do we see
managers of large firms stake so much (the whole company and their
own liberty) on so little (concealment of off-balance sheet obligations
and earnings manipulation).
Thus did Enron's managers cross the line from risk-averse to riskprone behavior. Did they do so rationally? We have seen that they had
their reasons. We should add compensation to the list. Like most
managers today, Enron's managers received significant compensation
in the form of stock options. Option holding dulls the actor's
sensitivity to degrees of distress on the downside, and at the same time
184. mItkins Letter, supra note 149 (referring to Raptor deals); see also Kraweic,
supra note 51, at 321-22 (describing Robert Citron of Orange County and the voters'
acceptance of his risky investment strategies).
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giving the actor an incentive to generate chances for upside gains of
high magnitude. Thus directed, a group of managers certainly would
be more disposed to high-risk strategies. It should be noted, however,
that stock-option-based incentives tend to operate in the long term. To
effect a tie between compensation and Enron's managers' obsession
with short-term numbers, we need to look to Enron's performancebased bonus scheme. These awards grew as Enron's stock price
performed better relative to the market as a whole and as managers
met performance criteria in respect of factors like funds flow, return on
equity, and earnings per share. ISS Amounts paid in 2001 based on
2000's numbers were substantial: $9.6 million for Lay; $7.52 million
for Skilling, $3.925 million for Jeffrey MacMahon; $3.036 million for
Fastow; and $2.3 million for Kopper.186
But option holding and bonus taking do not, taken alone, provide
a plausible explanation for the Enron disaster. For one thing, option
holding now is ubiquitous among American managers. If option
holding explains the behavior of Enron's managers, we accordingly
should be seeing their behavior pattern everywhere instead of the
present handful of companies beset by scandal. As yet, however, these
rmns remain outliers. For another thing, the Enron officers gambled
with more than other people's money. As they crossed the line to
fraud, they staked their personal liberty. One senses such actions to lie
outside the box of option pricing.
For an alternative rational expectations explanation of the
behavior of Enron's managers, we can turn to the "end period
problem.,,187 ill this scenario, a ordinarily risk-averse rational actor
rmds her firm in distress due to business reverses. Bankruptcy being
the most negative outcome possible, the actor rationally becomes riskprone, gambling everything in one last play to avoid destruction.
Concealment comes with the territory. This explanation would make
sense for Enron if either the foregoing story of conventional business
reverses turns out to be much more severe than presently known or the
185. EnronScheduIe 14A, supmnote 138, at 15-16.
186. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid Huge Bonuses in '01,' Experts See a Motive for
Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,2002, at AI.
187. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fmud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691. Professor RoseAckennan offers an interesting variation on the theme in Susan Rose-Ackennan, Risk-Taking
and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 277, 304-09 (1991). She
shows how otherwise rational managers of 1980s savings and loans faced federal receivership
if they continued conservative investment policies due to the fact that they had to pay market
rates to their savers. Accordingly, they gambled all on risky investments.
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allegations of a derivatives-based disaster turn out to be true. On either
scenario, Enron's principals stumbled into distress and rationally
started manufacturing income and concealing obligations as a way of
buying time to turn things around and avert disaster.
If, on the other hand, Enron's business was sound but troubled, we
need to tell a longer story. This was a fmn where concealment became
a way of life long before the start of the end period. 188 Enron's
principals did not just wake up to fmd themselves in trouble. They
created much of the trouble themselves, voluntarily and unnecessarily
driving the fmn into an end period. They did so in pursuit of projects
and returns that their business plan could not support. Arguably,
rational, risk-averse actors would have moderated the pace of
expansion, reporting negative numbers to the extent necessary to
portray the fmn's fmancial condition accurately. To tell a compelling
causation story on this scenario, we must look to Enron's
organizational culture as well as its principals' economic incentives. 189
Enron fell because it pursued winning to excess. At Enron,
\vinning was everything and everything became a tournament. Its
business plan took unbundling to its logical conclusion, projecting a
competitive victory over not only other fmns but vertical industrial
organization itself. Enron's top managers wanted to be surrounded
exclusively by winners. So they made their workplace a tournament
without end. They created a space that, unlike the outside world of
regulation protecting losers, valued above all winning and the risk
taking which necessarily precedes it. Wmning also meant stunning
earnings numbers: Where the tournament is ongoing, what counts is
the most recent score. So important was winning at Enron that it
became conflated with value maximization.
Labor economics holds out a formal model of a "superstar"
actor. 190 Inspired by the distribution of returns in show business, this
describes situations where the size of personal rewards grows in
lockstep \vith the size of the market and both market size and reward
are skewed to the most talented people in the activity.191 Applying the
188. The most famous example is the Potemkin Village trading floor Skilling ordered
set up in 1998 in order to hoodwink visiting analysts. Jason Leopold, Questioning the Books:
Enron Executives Helped to Create Fake Trading Room, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, atA4.
189. See Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, at 114-15,130.
190. For a popular application of this economic theory, see ROBERT H. FRANK &
PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995).
191. Sherwin Rosen, The Economics ofSuperstars, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 845 (1981).
For example, where consumers of music prefer to hear the most able artist perform, the
producer gets an equilibrium unit price that is proportional to her talent. Because neither the
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description by analogy to finns in a market, for a "superstar firm,"
small advantages in capability vis-a.-vis the firm's competitors result in
the firm disproportionately dominating its market. No doubt Enron
saw itself in this light-as the Tiger Woods of energy trading. Its
problem was that, given ease of entry into energy trading and shrinking
margins caused by successful competitors, its superstar status was in
serious jeopardy. Energy trading turned out to be structurally unsuited
to the continued dominance by a superstar first entrant: In a superstar
market, there is imperfect substitution amongst competing
producers;192 in energy trading, one proprietary trading floor turned out
to look like another so far as concerned the customers. To realize
Skilling's vision of being the biggest and best in energy, therefore,
Enron had to keep going boldly where no one had gone before and
open new markets. 193 This resulted in heroic demands for new capital
and problems with earnings figures. To keep their victory lap going,
Enron's managers invented winning value numbers, crossing the line
to fraud.
Enron's managers, with a belief system biased toward winning,
lost touch with both hard economic constraints and the rules of the
game. Ironically, that disconnection followed readily from their
tournament workplace environment. Of course, such a reward system
can be accounted for as an incentive and monitoring scheme. 194 But as
price nor cost of other imputs in the market depends on talent, more able sellers produce
more output units. The payoff to the top producer is an increasing and convex function of
talent. The price of talent thus is an increasing function of talent, causing the distrubtion of
income to be skewed relative to the distribution of ability. Id at 845-47; see also Glenn M.
MacDonald, The Economics ofRising Stars, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 155 ( 1988) (extending the
model to show a superstar market can allow for the development of young talent).
192. Rosen, supmnote 191, at 846. In addition, (1) property rights are assigned to the
seller so there are no free-rider problems due to nonexclusion and (2) joint consumption of
the product by a mass audience creates a scale economy allowing a small number of
producers to service the whole market. Id at 847.
193. Professor Krawiec's description of the make-up of the rogue trader and the
tournament structure of the trading floor provide a useful analogy. Krawiec, supm note 51, at
310-14; see also Langevoort, Selling Hope, supm note 51, at 658-66 (noting that the required
performance levels necessary to maintain the professional image can increase over time and
push an actor to risk-prone behavior).
194. The text uses the term "tournament structure" loosely. The usage should be
distinguished from that of the formal economics of tournaments, which address certain
workplace practices. More particularly, the worker exchanges compensation for a promotion
opportunity; the employer undertakes to promote a set percentage of the employees based on
their rank ordering in the tournament. The tournament results in economies respecting
monitoring costs-the employer need only observe the workers' relative performance--even
as it incentivizes the employees. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONAL ECONOMICS 25-37
(1995). This economic theory has been applied to large law firms. See MARc GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW Foo.!

HeinOnline -- 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1330 2001-2002

2002]

DARK SIDE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE

l331

corporate cultures develop, tournament schemes can do more than
encourage strenuous efforts and IIlter out losers. They tend to produce
winners of a certain type. 19S To be sure, such executives are ambitious,
persistent, optimistic, and hard working. But persistence does not
always guarantee success. Enron's managers pursued their business
plan so persistently that they lost their flexibility.196 They continued to
open new markets on an accelerated schedule, even though their need
to maintain an investment grade credit rating made it impossible to do
this and at the same time tell the truth about themselves to the capital
markets. Nor is the relentless optimism of the tournament winner
always a productive force. The optimistic entrepreneur labors under a
cognitive bias, which underweights downside risk and overweights
both the probability of upside gain and the entrepreneur's own abilities
and contributions.197
That cognitive bias is inseparable from
shareholder value maximization, for the big scores in the stock market
come from fmns run by entrepreneurs rather than by conventional
managers. On the downside, however, it can lead to errant decision
making.
Tournament winners get where they are because they see the
world around them in ways that serve their purposes, sacrificing a
measure of realism. This limitation on their perception is not
necessarily undesirable-it contributes to their success, keeping them
focused, flexible, and able to get the job done: 93 But there can be
significant costs when material information fails to register. At Enron,
just as dissent was not tolerated, so was bad news systematically
filtered out. It comes as no surprise that the most outrageous selfdealing described in the Powers Report occurred when Enron was
dismantling a transaction structure and wiping the transactional debris
from its table. 199 Eyes at Enron tended to be averted from such cleanThe application is controversial. See David B. Wilkins & O. Mitu Oulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament ofLalryers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in
the Intemal Labor Markets ofElite Finns, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581 (1998) (showing that the law

(1991).

finn tournament differs from the tournament described in the economics in significant ways,
while asserting that a tournament metaphor remains useful in understanding law ["InTI
practices).
195. Donald C. Langevoort, Enron and the Organizational Psychology of Hypercompetition: An Essay for Lany Mitchell, 70 OEO. WASH L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
196. Id at 142-43.
197. See Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, at 139-40; Langevoort,
Selling Hope, supra note 51, at 645.
198. Langevoort, supra note 195, at 4.
199. The Southampton grab of Fastow, Kopper and others occurred in connection with
the windup up the LJMl SPE. When Enron repurchased Chewco's interest in JED!, Kopper
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up exercises. Actors at Enron also underestimated external threats,zoo
particularly regulatory threats. At Enron, success always had
depended on averting or destroying regulatory opponents. Skilling, as
we have seen, saw nothing wrong with averting his eyes from
insubordination within Enron's own ranks-so long as the result had
been profitable. Unsurprisingly, tournament winners score highly on
the Machiavellian psychological measure. 201
As Enron's leaders stepped across the line to fraud, their belief
system trumped reality. So as to avoid confronting their own failures,
they averted their eyes from the manifest implications of their own
actions. 202 They acted out the role of the tournament winner right up to
the end.

rv.

ENRON AND CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION

The preceding story supports a highly confident prediction that
the federal securities laws' regime of ex post liability will come to bear
on Enron's managers with considerable force. It only remains to
complete the picture of who knew what and when. Enron's former top
managers have shown manifest awareness of this. Skilling professes
ignorance: ''We're all trying to figure out what happened.... This was
a tragedy. I had no idea the company was in anything but excellent
shape.,,203 Moreover, "I didn't do anything wrong.... I think we made
the right decisions."204 The Fastow partnerships? These were set up to
save Enron money; information about the $30 million "stunned"
him.20S Billions of off-balance sheet debt obligations? "I did not know
about that.,,206 As for Fastow, his lawyer, David Boies, has added two
points. First, Enron's chief accounting officer did not report to Fastow.
Second, although Fastow was aware of the operations of the SPEs,
which his own firm managed, he was not aware of the activities of the

negotiated a $10 million return on an initial investment of $125,000. POWERS REpORT, supra
note 53, at 8.
200. This is "cognitive conservatism." Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51,
at 135-37.
201. Langevoort, supra note 195, at 3; see also Samuel Bowles et aI., The

Determinants ofEarnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J.

ECON LIT.

1137, 1161-62 (2001)

(collecting studies showing high convariance of "high mach" scores with income and
occupational attainment, particularly in loosely structured sales organizations).
202. See Langevoort, Organized Dlusions, supra note 51, at 144-45.
203. Oppel, supra note 79, at C3.

204. Id
205. Id
206. Id
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other SPEs.207 Finally, Ken Lay has disavowed any knowledge of the
numbers and side deals-they always were, he said, ''way over [his]
head:'20~ Thus does the defense strategy emerge: Cite the complexity
of the contractual arrangements in question, plead ignorance, and point
the fmger downward in the chain of command.

A.

Enron and the Monitoring Model ofCorporate Govemance

The Powers Report rightly faults Enron's board for defective
ongoing monitoring of the LJM transactions. But like all such
reprimands, this one has the benefit of hindsight. And even as it fmds
fault, the report also shows us that Enron's board went by the book
when it approved the LJM transaction structure. Favorable reports lay
on the table at the board meeting in question.209 Andersen and Enron's
outside counsel, Vrnson & Elkins, had been involved every step of the
way. Because of the transactions' self-dealing aspect, the Board
required ongoing monitoring by managers representing Enron's
interest. In addition, the Audit Committee was to review the
transactions annually. There also was active concealment of negative
information by middle management. This occurred both with the
sham transaction concocted to lend Chewco the appearance of an
outside equity investoi lO and with a series of patch-up arrangements
concluded after the swaps went sour.2l1 At only one point does the
Powers Report account hold out hope for a plaintiff contemplating a
duty of care lawsuit against Enron's outside directors. The three
committee reviews of the ongoing LJM-related transactions were
conducted quickly, lasting no more than 10 or 15 minutes, without
probing questions being asked. 212 Between Smith v. Van Gorkonf13 and
the duty of care cases respecting fmancial institutions,214 these facts
207. Floyd Norris, S.Re. Wants" to Question Fonner Officer, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13,
2001, at C6.
208. Alex Berenson, Chiefs U0rds Paint Hands-Off Image, but Actions Offer
Different Weu~ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at C7.
209. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 157.
210. Id at 46.
211. Id at 98, 115-18.
212. Id at 162.
213. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Enron is an Oregon
corporation. Delaware law is referenced as a source of persuasive points respecting the
fiduciary duties of officers and directors of publicly traded corporations. Enron appears to
have had more than enough in the way of internal compliance controls to excuse the board
under the supine standard of In re Caremark Intemationai, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
214. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 846-47 (N.J. 1981)
(finding breach of duty when directors failed to act to prevent other directors from
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give a plaintiff a basis for argument. But a strong defense can be
anticipated-each ofAndersen, Vinson & Elkins, and Enron's managers
had reviewed the transactions and continued to endorse them. The
audit committee met with the Andersen partners with Enron's
managers out of the room to ask if there was anything about which to
worry. Andersen kept silent.215
Thus do the facts of the case send a strong but disturbing signal:
Enron stumbled into its end period while following the book of good
governance practice, at least nominally. A question arises: Why did
our system of corporate governance, with its monitors and
gatekeepers, fail to interpose frictions on the formulation and
execution of the strategy so as to cause prudent modifications?
Vigilant monitoring might have contained the recklessness, saving the
company. As a matter of policy, the rmger points not to lower officers,
as Skilling and Fastow would have it, but to Enron's outside directors
and with them the monitoring model of corporate governance.
The monitoring model holds out an objective, process-based
system. It importunes companies to put a majority of highly qualified
outside directors on the board and to integrate the board into its
decision-making structure as an active participant. At the level of
mandate, however, it only requires that boards go through the motions
of making considered business judgments respecting corporate
transactions. It does not and cannot make the further subjective
inquiry into the degree of attention and quality of judgment actually
brought to bear. Corporate counsel are well-schooled in packaging
documentation so that compliance is well evidenced. The system
responds to breakdowns such as Enron's by adding layers of new
processes, each a ritualized enactment of the substance of the good
governance.
To see how little this can mean in terms of sustained and
searching confrontation with problematic topics, consider the audit
committee of the board of directors and its central place in the system.
This was the venue within Enron for outside monitoring of accounting
policies respecting SPE compliance and the place where questions
should have been asked about compliance with GAAP respecting SPE
transactions and the 2000 :MD&A's failure to provide complete
information about Enron's contingent obligations. Audit committee
practice became a focal point of corporate governance reform efforts
misappropriated trust funds); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (noting
that directors must "exercise some degree of skill and prudence and diligence").
215. POWERS REpORT, supmnote 53, at 161.
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in the late 1990s, after headline audit failures at Cendant and
Sunbeam. SEC Chainnan Arthur Levitt complained publicly about
audit committee independence and composition. The New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities dealers (NASD)
responded by tightening their listing standards.216 Under the new rules,
audit committees had to have the right to hire and rrre the auditor; they
had to have at least three members, each of whom should be
independent and rmancialiy literate, with at least one member having
accounting or rmancial expertise.217 At around the same time, the
SEC's revised proxy disclosure rules respecting audit committees.
Starting in 2001, there had to be disclosures about member
independence, the report had to state whether the committee
recommended that the Board fIle the audited rmancials in the rrrm's
lO-K report, and the committee's charter had to be attached as an
exhibit.2ls
For a pristine example of compliance with ali the foregoing rules,
open Enron's 2001 proxy statemene l9 Its audit committee of five met
five times during 2000 with its outside auditors and its inside
managers responsible for accounting and internal controls. The
committee was chaired by a professor emeritus in accounting from
Stanford University. And yet despite the review and the committee's
formal recommendation of the audited rmancials, the audit had failed
and ,vith it the committee process.
Two alternative reform palliatives suggest themselves as the next
step in the regulation of audits and audit committees. The rrrst
originated with Arthur Levitt and follows the example of Delaware
special negotiating committees, which hire their own legal and
business advisors.22o By extension, audit committees should hire their
independent auditor to lead and assist them in evaluating internal
compliance systems and the accounting treatments applied by the
company's managers and auditors.22I Such a contrarian voice might
have raised difficult questions about Enron's accounting policies
216. Jeffrey Goldfarb, New Panel to Devise Stricter Oversight Proposals for
IndependentAuditors, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1455, 1455 (Oct 2,1998).
217. HERwrrz & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 178.
218. Audit Committee Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.306, 229.306 (2000).
219. Enron Schedule 14A, supra note 138, at 12-13,42-44.
220. Se4 e.g., Weinberger v. UOp, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,709 (Del. 1983) (suggesting in
a cash-out merger an independent negotiating committee with own counsel and investment
banker).
221. For a suggestion of this, see Arthur Levitt, The ''Numbers Game," Remarks at
N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/l98/spch220.txt (last visited Mar. 13,2002).
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respecting SPEs and afIiliates. Whether the process of questioning
would have led to a different accounting result and :full disclosure of
SPE arrangements is another question. For one thing, audit committee
members do not differ from other board members in their cooperative
dispositions. For another thing, given a limited universe of what are
now four big accounting rrrms, each under pressure to approve the
same types of deals, one wonders how much lawyerly adversity can be
imported into the system.
The second measure comes from present SEC Chainnan Harvey
Pitt in his rIrst public response to the Enron collapse. Under this
measure, companies and auditors are to make a "[c]onscientious
identification and assessment . .. [of] the three, four, or five most
critical accounting principles" to the company's reporting-the
principles involving "the most complex, subjective or ambiguous
decisions or assessments."m They should then make a clear
presentation to investors of the problems underlying the decision and
report the "range of possible effects in differing applications."223 Here
the insight is that the monitoring process can lose its way under stacks
of technical reports. Accordingly, the process mandate needs to
confront moments at which the managers and directors make critical
judgments and force them to disclose not only the result and its
justification but the competing variables and counterfactuals. By
implication, had Enron been forced to this higher level of disclosure it
would have followed less aggressive accounting policies.
Or,
alternatively, much of the accounting would have stayed the same, but
Enron would have been forced to make additional pro forma
disclosures, which would have revealed all the debt or showed how
earnings might have been lower if all of the SPEs were consolidated.
What are the chances that Pitt's reform would have led to
disclosure of Enron's contingent liabilities? One suspects that many
more than five problematic accounting treatments had material effects
on this set of rmancials. Nothing but hindsight appears to assure that
either ,that consolidation policy, the treatment of the swaps, or
contingent liabilities be included on a mandated special disclosure list.
In addition, like all other variations on the theme of process guarantee,
this one easily could deteriorate into an empty governance ritual
having little impact either on the quality of attention and discussion at
board and committee meetings or on the understanding of investors in
222. Harvey L. Pitt, Editorial, How to Prevent Future Enrons,
2001, atAl8.
223. Id

WALL ST.
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the stock market. So long as ex post review for compliance relies on
objective evidence in the form of a thick minute book, a process rule
grounded in subjective "conscientiousness" merely importunes.
Significantly, in a follow-up announcement, the SEC has
promised to require each frrm's :MD&A to disclose critical accounting
policies-those "most important to the portrayal of a company's
fmancial condition ... and require management's most difficult,
subjective or complex judgments"224-without a limiting number.
Perhaps an objective mandate will yet emerge here. But a new
disclosure mandate will not restore confidence in the system. Enron's
managers concealed the information from their published fmancials
for a reason, after all. What is needed is a third party with the
authority to impose the rules.
Meanwhile, if reliable boardroom "conscientiousness" is what is
needed, the solution is an independently nominated outside director-an
outside super monitor. This suggestion figured prominently in policy
discussions a decade ago, when it was thought that newly emerging
activist investment institutions could fmd it convenient to pool
resources and nominate candidates to the boards of poorly performing,
large capitalization frrms.225 Unfortunately, no super monitors have
appeared because the collective action problems, which prevent
shareholders from coordinating on and investing in their own board
candidates persist despite concentration of holdings in institutional
hands. We will not see super monitors absent massive federal
intervention to change the structure of board election and proxy
solicitation.226
Enron, then, reminds us that the monitoring model assures us of
little. It gives only a circumstantial guarantee of good governance
because it only requires evidence of a "conscientious;' well-informed
224. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC to Propose New
Corporate Disclosure Rules (Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Press Release, Feb. 13, 2002],
available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-22.txt (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
225. See Ronald 1. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 883-88 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative VOting, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
124, 133-42 (1994).
226. Perhaps the bottom line message of Enron for corporate governance lies on the
contrarian side, with those who suggest that excessive reliance has been placed on the
monitoring model. In this view, a majority of outside directors is not the sine qua non of
good governance, and enhanced presence of top managers would improve boardroom
processes. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms. and the Unintended Consequences ofIndependence andAccountability, 89 GEO. L.1.
797, 805-15 (2001). Would a few additional top managers on the board have improved
governance at Enron? There is no way to tell. But they hardly could have made things worse.
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business judgment. The conscientiousness itself is ill-suited to ex post
verification. In the alternative, the substance of the business judgment
could be reviewed. But we have avoided such strict scrutiny on the
sound theory that ex post review of risk taking would have perverse
deterrent effects. In the chasm separating the circumstantial guarantee
from such an actual guarantee lie untold billions of lost investment
dollars, and not only in respect ofEnron. It is a cost of capitalism.227
With that vision of billions in lost capital we finally encounter the
self-regulatory corporate law scheme's last line of defense, the
investors themselves.228 When we look at Enron's shareholders, in
particular the institutional shareholders (and the market actors analysts
who sell them services), we witness a failure as marked as the failure
in Enron's boardroom. Institutional actors with significant capital
stakes, whether debt or equity, have access to top executives. It is their
job to ask questions when company disclosures fail to tell a coherent
story. We have seen that in Enron's case a long list of questions needed
to be asked. We also have seen that Enron's public disclosures,
although presenting an inadequate picture of the company, provided a
basis for asking every question that needed to be asked. Two stand out
even without the benefit of hindsight: (1) Just how much contingent
liability will be triggered if your stock falls? (2) What percentage of
net income would disappear if your SPEs had to be consolidated? The
questions' formulation did not require an advanced business degree. A

227. For a more detailed discussion of the law reform agenda, see Jeffrey N. Gordon,
'fWlat Enron Means for the Management and Control ofthe Modem Business Corporation:
Some Initial ReBections, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 1233 (2002).
228. The same questions can be asked in respect of Enron's debtholders: How could
they put $8 billion into the company without asking for an explanation about the contingent
liabilities alluded to in the MD&A? So as concerns Enron's largest banks, an agency
explanation resonates well: The middle-level bankers in charge of new loans were not about
to disrupt relations with a big client. Patrick McGeehan, 2 Early Enron Lenders Didn't See
the End Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at C1 (quoting Professor Henry Hu). Questions
also are arising about conflicts of interest-Enron's lead banks had an incentive to be
accommodating in order to keep up the flow of investment banking business from Enron.
There results a revival of discussion about the desirability of the Glass Steagall Act.
The foregoing question applies with greater force to the rating agencies, who
downgraded Enron only as the house of cards was tumbling. Contingent guarantees are not
rocket science. In the wake of the scandal, two agencies have announced plans to speed up
their ratings review process. Riva D. Atlas, Enron Spurs Debt Agencies to Consider Some
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at C6. For a persuasive argument that the informational
quality of ratings has declined in recent years, see Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
619 (1999).
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diligent Accounting for Lawyers student who studied Enron's
fmancials with care ought to be up to the task.229
But the questions were not asked. Now, the usual villain at this
point is the Wall Street analyst. These actors today are dismissed as
mouthpieces for their own fmns' investment bankers-because
negative reports destabilize investment banking relationships, negative
reports are more and more rarely given.230 Certainly, the analysts
provided no early warnings in Enron's case; indeed, many stayed
positive even as the collapse went into its late stages.231 But the
analysts' reputational stock fell to the floor even before Enron's
common stock. No experienced institutional investor was relying on
them.232
One might have expected holders of significant blocks of stock to
speak up. Enron had such stockholders. Janus Capital Corp. owned
five percent of Enron's outstanding shares in early 2001. In the words
of one Janus analyst, Enron epitomized "the opportunistic thinking of
the new economy." Janus managers met repeatedly with Enron's
management and included the SPEs in their questioning. Apparently,
they did not also insist on coherent answers. Although Janus sold off
its Enron during the period from March to October 2001, it still netted
$200 million of losses. "We'll spend a lot of time internally on our
experience \vith Enron," said a Janus manager whose fund still had
four percent its assets in Enron in April. 233 Alliance Premier Growth
Fund, in contrast, still had 4.1 percent of its assets in Enron at the end
of the third quarter of 2001. One of its managers later called Enron a
"faith stock"-one of many fmns with a large market capitalization and
so many moving parts that "nobody knows how they put it together."

229. A caveat should be noted. As we have seen, Enron's disclosures were carefully
written so as to communicate that everything was all right, assuming that Enron had integrity.
Even so, the questions should occur to an investor with a significant stake and an everyday
dose of skepticism.
230. Enron did investment banking business only with firms whose analysts rated their
stock a strong buy. John Schwartz, Man Mo DoubtedEnron Enjoys New Recognition, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at CS.
231. McTague, supm note 77, at 1771.
232. A small number of independent frrms do research companies, for a fee. As
Richard Grant put it at the time, congressional committees were examining analysts in
connection with the Enron collapse, the real problem is that investors do not care enough
about getting independent and unbiased research to pay the price. Alex Berenson,
Washington Wants Wall St Changes. But How?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2S, 2002, at C6.
233. Aaron Lucchetti, Men Bad Stocks Happen to Good Mutual Funds: Enron
Could Spark New Attention toAccounting, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13,2001, at C1.
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"Shame on me," says the manager, "for not doing something" about
the opaque fmancials. 234
Such stories imply that these investment institutions, despite their
significant stakes, acted out the archetype of the noise trader, investing
Such
on market hyperbole rather than fundamental value. 235
investment behavior is driven by cognitive bias rather than expert
monitoring. These investors chase the trend as they build up their
stakes. Then, holding significant blocks in a firm with a price earnings
ratio of sixty, they appear to have followed what Kahneman and
Tversky called the representative heuristic, making predictions by
taking a short history or a small set of facts (Enron's success with
electricity trading) and expanding it into a broader picture.236 On the
downside, some seem to have held on even as the handwriting was on
the wall, subjectively assessing the situation by reference to their own
sunk costs.237
The point is neither that agents of investment institutions always
invest foolishly nor that such agents never intervene constructively on
the fmancial side. Rather, the point is that there are surprisingly tight
constraints on their utility as a governance check. It seems that even
substantial institutional block holding, at least at the five percent level,
provides no basis for assuming that the tough questions have been
asked and addressed. To fmd a shareholder who takes on the
properties of a super monitor, we presumably need a holder of a bigger
block-a twenty-five or thirty percent owner with an inside position or
inside agents. One hopes that such an actor, very common in the
capital structures of firms on the continent of Europe, would have
prevented the fatal excesses of Enron's managers. But, then, if Enron
teaches us anything, it is to question the reasonableness of reliance on
any corporate monitor.

R

EnroD, GenerallyAcceptedAccounting Principle~ andAuditor
Independence

In addition to being the largest bankruptcy reorganization in
American history (as of December 2, 2001), Enron undoubtedly also
234. Id
235. See Andrei Shliefer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance, J. ECON. PERSPEC., Spring 1990, at 19, 19-26.
236. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80
PSYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973).
237. See Daniel Kahneman & Mark W. Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, J.
PORTFOLIO MGT., Summer 1998, at 52.
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was the biggest audit failure. But, as of this writing, it looks as if the
liability provisions of federal securities law may never get the chance
to work as contemplated in the case. The auditor, Arthur Andersen,
was delivered over to federal prosecutors who avoid attempts to prove
criminal violations of complex securities law provisions, preferring
wire fraud theories communicable in monosyllabic words. Andersen
accordingly was pursued not for its audit performance but for the
overtime use of paper shredders at its Houston office in October 2001
as Enron's condition became critical. Its punishment already has
exceeded all expectations as of the time of Enron's bankruptcy riling.
The indictment and conviction of the fIrm as a whole,238 rather than
only its Houston office, pushed it toward the edge of collapse as
foreign affiliates and audit clients alike promptly deserted it.239
Even Enron's securities plaintiffs have distanced themselves from
Andersen. Andersen met the plaintiff class at the settlement table in
short order. Apparently, it had determined that no signifIcant
protection would be forthcoming from either the pleading barrier
erected to private accountant's liability under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 or from a line of cases holding that,
absent a direct fmancial interest in the client, an auditor's interest in a
reputation for honesty and care makes an allegation of scienter
240
implausible. Between the egregious nature of the audit breakdown,
the documented awareness of questionable accounting at Andersen's
headquarters,241 the ex post shredding ofEnron-related documents, and
subsequent termination of the partner in charge,242 the plaintiffs had the
smoking gun they needed. But to make it work, Andersen had to
survive to fund a settlement. The plaintiffs, watching their deep pocket

238. See Kurt EichenwaId, Andersen Charged with Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y.
Tll\1ES, Mar. 15,2002, atAl.

239. They have been welcomed by Andersen's delighted competitors. See Henny
Sender, Andersen s Audit-Client Defections Come at Perfect Time for Its Overstaffed Rivals,
WALL ST. 1, Apr. 4, 2002, at Cl. Andersen has been forced to layoff thousands of
employees. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen to Cut 27% ofUs. Staff,WALL ST. 1, Apr. 9,
2002, at C24.
240. See Section 21(D)(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(D)(b)(2),
ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881,900 (1934). For representative cases, see Melder v. Morris, 27 E3d
1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994); Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 E2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990);
Retsky Family Ltd. P'ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP, No. 97-C-7694, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17459 (N.D. lll. Oct. 21,1998).
241. Jonathan Weil, EnronsAuditorsDebatedPartnershipLosses, WALL ST. 1, Apr. 3,
2002, atCl.
242. Thaddeus Herrick & Alaxi Barrionuevo, Jfere Enron, Andersen Too Tightly
Knit?, WALL ST. 1, Jan. 21,2002, at Cl.
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shrink with startling rapidity as 2002 unfolded,243 expanded their list of
defendants, reaching out to secondary actors among Enron's banks,
underwriters, and contract counterparties.244
Meanwhile, Andersen's partners staked its survival on a
restructuring proposed by Paul Volcker, hastily brought aboard so the
rInn could avail itself of his reputation for business rectitude. Volcker
tried to restore probity to Andersen by having it divest itself of all
consulting, going forward as the only large accounting firm
perfonning only the audit function. The palliative turned out to be too
little, too late.245
For present purposes, the more interesting question about
Andersen is why, despite the assumption of the securities cases, a rInn
like Andersen, for which a reputation for probity and care was as
necessary as an investment grade credit rating was for Enron,
compromise itself in this way? If this reputational interest cannot be
relied upon to cause big accounting rInns (then five in number, soon to
be four) to impose the rules on reporting companies, then significant
law reform is required.
1.

The Violations

Enron's collapse implicates (at least) three important accounting
topics: (a) the off-balance sheet treatment of SPEs and equity
affiliates, (b) the treatment of contingent obligations, and (c) fair value
accounting for derivatives and energy sales contracts.
a.

SPEs and Equity Affiliates

Recall that at the time of its Chapter 11 filing, Enron already had
admitted that its rmancial statements had overstated its earnings due to
failure to follow the rules for qualifYing SPEs and indefensible, even
fraudulent, treatments of SPE transactions. Some of these violations
were technical-the failure to meet the three percent requirement with
either Chewco or Talon, the LJMl-re1ated SPE.246 The more serious
violations concerned the sham substance of the LJM-re1ated swap
transactions.
243. See, e.g., Robert Frank et aI., Andersen Cuts Enron Settlement Offer by Half,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2002, at Cl.
244. Complaint, In re Emon Corp. Securities Litigation, C.A. No. H-01-3624 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 8, 2002).
245. Se~ e.g., Devon Spurgeon & Cassell Bryan-LO\v, Can Andersen Partners Keep
TheirFinnAlive?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at Cl.
246. POWERS REpORT, supra note 53, at 15-16.
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Note that the identification of these violations does not by itself
state a policy issue for GAAP. The problem could lie only with the
audit. To see the difficulty of the substantive question respecting
SPEs, consider the fact that Enron had thousands of additional SPEs
and equity affiliates. As to these no violations have been identified.
Here is the question: Would the consolidation of Chewco, JEDI, and
the LJM-related SPEs have resulted in meaningful rmancials, or did
many more affiliated entity rmancials need to be consolidated for a
meaningful picture ofEnron to emerge?
Let us take the SPEs rIrst. Under SFAS No. 140, issued in 2000,
transfers of rmancial assets to SPEs are treated as sales by the
transferor rIrm so long as, among other things, equity interests in the
SPE are not returned as consideration for the assets transferred and the
SPE gets control of the assets with the right to pledge or exchange
them.247 All you have to do is have the SPE vehicle meet the outside
equity requirement, and for all that appears at this time, Enron did so
with respect to the vast majority of its SPEs.
Now let us take up the equity affiliates. These relationships are
dealt with under GAAP rules applicable to all parent-subsidiary
relationships. These rules are formal; they do not inquire into the
substance of control arrangements. Consolidation follows from
greater than fifty percent ownership. At fifty percent equity ownership
down to twenty percent, accounting is by the equity method, the mode
of accounting employed by Enron for its unconsolidated equity
affiliates. Under it, there is no consolidation of the investee company.
Instead a portion of the income or loss of the investee flows through to
the investor's balance sheee4s (JIe have seen that Enron's income
statement showed significant added income under this treatment. 249)
Significantly, vocal dissatisfaction with these rules' form over
substance approach has been expressed within the accounting
profession. For twenty years, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) has kept open a project inquiring into an alternative
approach based on a substantive dermition of control. Reporting
companies and the big accounting rIrms, notably including Andersen
and Enron,250 have vigorously opposed the project, criticizing the
247. FASB, Summary of JFAS No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities (Sept. 2000).
248. MICHAEL DIAMOND ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: REpORTING AND ANALYSIS
535-540 (5th ed. 2000).
249. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
250. Glenn R. Simpson, Power Play: Deals that Took Enron Under Had Many
Supporters, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10,2002, at AI.
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FASB's draft rules as unworkab1e. 2S1 The opposition has succeeded
and nothing has been done. But, in the wake of Enron, the FASB
fmally has taken the initiative to push for a revision. The revision will
address "strawman" situations where, as with the LJM-related SPEs, a
second entity is indirectly controlled by a fIrst entity acting through its
agents and a disguised transaction structure. The revision also will
visit the question of what constitutes economic substance sufficient to
justify treatment as an independent entity.252 A minimum ten percent
outside equity requirement has been mooted.253 Finally, the revision
will address equity affiliate situations where party owning fIfty percent
or less of another entity's stock as a practical matter exercises
control.2S4 Action by FASB is predicted for the second quarter of
2002.255
It should be noted that the LJM-related SPEs suffered from an
additional infmnity under GAAP. Under SFAS No. 57, contracts
between Enron and the LJM-related SPEs were "related party
transactions." These include transactions with a counterparty whose
policies are sufficiently influenced by the fIrst party so as to prevent
one of the parties from fully pursuing its own interests. Given such a
tie, special footnote descriptions of the transactions are required,
including dollar amount impacts on reported earnings.256 From this it
follows that Enron should have disclosed the impact on its earnings of
transactions with LJM-related SPEs.
A reform suggestion arises from the related party analysis. The
fmanciaI and regulatory communities have been focusing exclusively
on the rules concerning the consolidation of SPE fmancials. This
inquiry is indeed pertinent: Had the SPEs been consolidated,
intercompany transactions would have dropped off of both the balance
sheet and income statement, with the result that Enron would not have
been able to pump up its net earnings with revenues and gains from
transactions with SPEs. At the same time, the substantive equivalent
of that result could have been achieved through footnote disclosure of

251. Steve Burkholder, Outlook 2002,34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rptr. (BNA) 214, 215 (Feb.
4,2002).
252. Jenkins Testimony, supra note 119, at 14-15.
253. Floyd Norris & Joseph Kahn, Rule Makers Talfe On Loopholes That Enron Used
in Hiding Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,2002, at AI.
254. Jenkins Testimony, supra note 119, at 14.
255. Burkholder, supra note 251, at 216.
256. SFAS No. 57, Related Party Disclosures, fJ~ 2, 24(f) (Mar. 1982); see also Jenkins
Testimony, supra note 119, at 16-17.
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the earnings impact of SPE transactions.257 Arguably, such disclosure
should be required whether or not the SPE is dealing with a related
party and without regard to the level of outside equity capitalization.
Even with a ten percent test, questions will continue to be asked about
the independence of SPEs. Finally, so long as the SPE's debt is
nonrecourse to the transferor, a consolidated liabilities statement is not
absolutely essential to the fair presentation of the transferor's fmancial
condition.
b.

Contingent Obligations

In our accounting inquiry up to this point, Enron has violated
GAAP only so far as concerns accounting matters restated in its
disclosures of October and November 2001-the Phantom Equity
Investor, the Watered Stock, the Equity Swaps that Weren't, and some
related transactions. These are significant violations, to be sure. But
as we have seen, they did not necessarily implicate the company's
collapse.
Part III's account of Enron's collapse also suggests a significant
accounting problem respecting the $4 billion of equity affiliate
guarantees that came out of the woodwork in November. As to these
GAAP has a defmite rule. To guarantee your equity afIiliate's
obligations is to take the disclosure treatment out of the parentsubsidiary or parent-investee context for treatment under the rules on
contingent losses. Here the case for disclosure by Enron is clear-cut.
Under SFAS No.5, loss contingencies are divided into three classes:
probable, reasonably possible, and remote. Probable losses should be
accrued; reasonably possible losses should be disclosed in footnotes
with information as to nature and magnitude; remote losses need not
be disclosed. There is a separate rule for fmancial guarantees. Here
even if the possibility of loss is remote, there should be footnote
disclosure as to nature and amount.258 It follows that Enron's fmancials
257. The SEC is suggesting that such disclosures be made in the MD&A. Harvey L.
Pitt, Written Testimony Concerning Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by

Enron and Other Public Companies: Before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs 10, available athttp://www.sec.gov/newsftestimony/032102tshlp.htm (Mar. 21,
2002) [hereinafter Pitt Testimony]. The Dodd-Corzine Bill would mandate stepped-up
disclosure respecting transactions with SPEs in SEC filings and require the SEC to make
formal recommendations to the FASB respecting consolidation rules. S. 2004, 107th Congo
§§ 301, 303 (2002).
258. See SFAS No.5, Accounting for Contingencies ~ 5 (Mar. 1975): "The Board
concludes that disclosure of [guarantees of indebtedness of others and others that in substance
have the same characteristic] shall be continued. The disclosure shall include the nature and
amount of the guarantee." Id; see also FASB Interpretation No. 34, Disclosure of Indirect
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were ill violation of GAAP for understating its obligations as
guarantor.259
A surprisingly strong counterargument may be anticipated. If a
loss contingency under a guarantee involved a small number-say
$100 million or under respecting Enron's case in 2000-an auditor
would have room to waive disclosure under GAAP's materiality
principle even if disclosure is otherwise required under SFAS No.5.
Accountants take a bright-line approach to materiality. An item
impacting pre-tax income less than five percent is clearly immaterial;
an item is clearly material only with an impact of ten percene60 Of
course $4 billion does not on its face pass the five percent test, even
for Enron at its zenith. But suppose we take the $4 billion contingency
at a time when Enron's stock was selling at almost ninety and ask on a
prospective basis what the probability is that the guarantees' triggers
will go off. If we were to take a highly confident view of Enron's
future and assert that there was only a one percent chance of triggers
keyed to stock prices below fifty going off, then the $4 billion
contingency can be discounted by its one percent chance of occurrence
to $40 million. That figure is sufficiently small to fly in under the five
percent radar so long as pre-tax income exceeds $1.2 billion.
Alternatively, with a ten percent discount rate (as was employed in
Enron's financials with respect to an unrelated $2 billion of letters of
credit and related obligations261), we get $400 million. Given $100
billion of revenues there remains a basis for argument, if not a
particularly strong one.
An additional materiality argument can be made. The guarantees
did not lie under the same contractual umbrella. They extended across
a series of unrelated transactions. Aggressive accountants apply the

Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others (Mar. 1981); HERWI1Z & BARREIT, supra note 8, at
617-20. Note that under SFAS No. 140, a separate recourse obligation against the transferor
of an asset to an SPE with respect to reimbursement for losses on the underlying portfolio (as
opposed to a derivative arrangement) continues to be treated under SFAS No.5. That is the
transferor makes an ongoing assessment of the amount of the loss in its fmancials rather than
adjusting the obligation to fair value and reporting it in income. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note
122, at 29.
259. And therefore were per se misleading for securities law purposes. See
Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series ReI. No.4, 11 Fed. Reg.
10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946), codified in Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 101,
reprinted in7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 72,921 (May 18, 1988).
260. The SEC, in contrast, insists that smaIl misstatements may be material in some
circumstances. See StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999).
261. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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materiality principle noncumulative1y.262 That is, they will take a $500
million contingent obligation in isolation and make a separate
materiality determination.
Given separate transactions with
sufficiently small numbers per transaction, materiality could be
deployed as a magic wand to make $4 billion of contingent obligations
go away.
The materiality defense should not carry the day for several
reasons. First, even though the transactions were separate, the trigger
terms shared common properties. Thus the separate treatment appears
inappropriate; even though the transactions were separate, the triggers
gave them a cumulative material effect. Of course, once we cumulate
the transactions we still have to discount the probability of occurrence.
Assuming ten percent probability we get $400 million, and $400
million is not an insignificant figure compared to Emon's stated $1.2
billion of earnings for 2000. Second, even without the benefit of
hindsight, some of the guarantees' trigger events were more than ten
percent probable. Emon's stock price rode up to ninety in a bubble
stock market in significant part on broadband projections. By the time
the 2000 fmancials were released, broadband was in trouble and the
bubble had burst. Third, the inference arises that the guarantees were
concealed for the very reason that they had a material bearing on the
credit rating on which Emon's business depended. Finally, the SEC
has strongly objected to aggressive applications of the materiality
principle by auditors. Among other things, the SEC staffhas reminded
auditors and registrants that omissions and misstatements should be
inspected both individually and in the aggregate to determine whether
the fmancials materially misstate the position and results of the
company.263
c.

Derivatives

Accusations respecting Emon's trading and derivatives operation
made after the Chapter 11 filing suggest more extensive problems
concerning Emon's reported earnings. Even if some of these
accusations prove to be true, blame will not necessarily devolve on
Emon's auditor, Arthur Andersen. The new rules respecting fair value
262. The auditor's work papers should show all immaterial adjustments on one sheet
and should include a cumulation. What happens after that is between the partner in charge
and the reporting company.
263. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,150; see also Kenneth C.
Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifjing and Protecting Materiality Sf11l1dards in Financial Statements:
A Review ofSEC StaffAccounting Bulletin 99, 55 Bus. LAW. 1039 (2000).
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accounting for derivative transactions264 and for Enron's long-term
power supply contracts are quite liberal. For example, they permitted
Enron to book a present profit based on a projection of power prices
ten years in the future. 26S Soft though the figures may have been, any
fault could turn out to lie with the new rules.266 Moreover, if Enron's
traders were overstating their profits, it is not automatically the
auditor's fault.
Audits entail spot checks, not exhaustive
reconstructions of all transactions.
The atmosphere of suspicion suggests that the new system of fair
value accounting for derivatives and energy contracts may be having
perverse effects. The 1990s move to fair value accounting has been
viewed as a breakthrough yielding more meaningful fmancial
statements. Mark-to-market treatment came into the system to prevent
financial institutions from using off-balance sheet accounting to hide
losses in derivatives trading. Now the crisis of confidence triggered by
Enron's collapse reveals a dark side. Absent a trading market, fair
value estimates are manipulable. And in a world obsessed with this
quarter's earnings figures, they are very likely to be manipulated
upward. Thus does fair value accounting sacrifice objectivity and
verifiability, once the bedrocks of GAAP.
d.

Summary

As to the first class of Enron accounting violation, concerning
SPE consolidation, welcome improvements to the rules can be
expected. But it nonetheless should be noted that the central problem
here lay not with the rules themselves but Enron's failure to follow
them. As to the second Enron accounting problem, nondisclosure of
contingent liability on SPE and equity affiliate obligations, GAAP
does not seem to be in need of repair. Guarantees are supposed to be
disclosed fully in footnotes. As to the third problem, movement to fair
value accounting needs to be reconsidered.
2.

Incentive Incompatibility at Arthur Andersen

We already have a case of audit failure here, only its extent
remains to ascertained. The question is not whether GAAP was
violated, but how a firm with substantial reputational capital staked on
264. SFAS No. 133, AccOlUlting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
(JlUle 1998).
265. See EITF Issue 98-10.
266. Norris & Eichenwald, supra note 166, at Cl.
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avoiding significant audit failures could have rendered a favorable
opinion on the subject fmancials. Why did Andersen's audit team not
pick up the sham in the swaps that weren't? Why did they let the
watered stock pass? Was there no review of the guaranty contracts?
We must await the results of the many investigations for the detailed
factual account.
A broad brush explanation can be offered presently, however. We
turn to Enron's 2001 proxy statement, which reports $25 million of
auditor fees and $27 million of other consulting fees to Andersen. 267
The sham in the equity swaps might have seemed like less of sham in
light of $5.7 million of Andersen consulting billings for advice
respecting Chewco and LJM-related transactions.268 Enron, in fact,
was Andersen's second biggest client, nationwide. In addition, the top
Enron officers in charge of accounting matters were former Andersen
accountants. Enron hired away Andersen employees on a routine
basis. Meanwhile, numerous Andersen auditors and consultants were
permanently posted in offices at Enron. In 1993, Andersen experts
had designed Enron's internal compliance system.269
The inference of capture is overwhelming. To protect the flow of
consulting fees and the value of their long-term relationship with
Enron, Andersen's auditors permitted actors at Enron to bully them
into signing off on dubious fmancials. Indeed, so cooperative was the
Andersen-Enron relationship that no bullying may have been needed.
Andersen's auditors simply mimicked the actions ofEnron's managers.
As residents of the Enron tower, they no doubt began to internalize the
fIrm culture, becoming risk-prone.
Such assimilation of a risk-prone fIrm culture is absolutely
unacceptable in an auditor. As a primary gatekeeper, the auditor's job
is not to collaborate but to bring an objective check to the managers'
reports. That check should be not only objective but normatively
counterbalancing, introducing a conservatism that reins in the riskprone tendencies of fIrm culture. The check should also correct results
distorted by cognitive bias.270 With that accomplished, the information
goes to the investment community so that it, rather than the fIrm's
managers, can make the best possible risk assessment.
Enron Schedule 14A, supmnote 138, at 13.
POWERS REpORT, supmnote 53, at 16l.
Herrick & Barrionuevo, supmnote 242, at Cl.
Cognitive limitations can impair audit quality even if the auditor has not been
See Robert A. Prentice, The Case ofthe irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight
into Secun"ties Fmud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 143-63 (2000).

267.
268.
269.
270.
captured.
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Professor Coffee offers a model of an effective fmancial
gatekeeper that highlights three requisite elements: The gatekeeper
must (1) be needed for a legally mandated certification, the accuracy
of which is observable by the protected class; (2) be a repeat player
with a significant reputational capital staked on proper performance;
and (3) be expecting only a nominal fee from anyone client. 271 As the
factors weaken, points of flexibility in the statement and application of
the rules make it more and more plausible for an auditor to pass on a
questionable treatment. 272
ill theory, the auditor's reputational interest plus a backstop threat
of legal liability should import the requisite adverseness to the auditorclient relationship. Until recently, such was the case. ill the 1990s,
two factors changed. First, as noted above, the liability system was
adjusted to make accounting finns less susceptible to liability to
private plaintiffs.273 Second, Big Five revenues for nonaudit or
"management advisory" services grew to fifty percent of total
revenues in 2000, where twenty years earlier they had constituted only
thirteen percent of total revenues. 274 The result for Andersen's
relationship with Enron is the third factor in Coffee's model above
ceased to obtain.
To get a sense of the degree to which Enron dominated its
auditor, step into the shoes of the partners in Andersen's Houston
office on January 1, 2001. The maintenance of good will with Enron's
managers must have held a permanent top spot on their list of
priorities. How likely, then, was it that an auditor would dare get in the
way of the plans of giants like Lay, Skilling, and Fastow? illdeed,
given millions in Andersen billings respecting the SPE set-ups, for an
auditor to question the sham would have been to undercut the positions
of Andersen superiors. So close was the relationship between
Andersen and Enron that the Coffee model's second factor became
compromised-Enron, and not Andersen as a whole, became the
primary reputational concem.275 Just as Skilling gambled with Enron's
271. John c. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,
Auditor Independence, and the Governance of Accounting 9-10 (2001) (Columbia Law
School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 191).
272. Id
273. The Big Five fIrms also lobbied intensively at the state level to assure the passage
of statutes recognizing the limited liability partnership. I am indebted to Matthew Barrett for
this point.
274. Coffee, supmnote271, at 27.
275. The term for this phenomenon is "sub goal pursuit." The leaders of subunits tend
toward excess zeal for their units interests at the expense of the larger fIrm's interests. John
C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical Wew of Corpomte
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future in order to make his numbers, Andersen's Houston office
gambled with the reputation of the partnership as a whole in order to
maintain the revenue flow from their profit center.276 But it also must
be noted that Andersen's central office in Chicago was not a passive
participant. Enron's most aggressive treatments, including LJMrelated transactions and MTM practices, were discussed in a meeting
between Andersen's Chicago and Houston offices on February 5,
2001. The participants acknowledged problems. But they ratified the
status quo, noting that Enron fees could reach $100 million a year.277
3.

Reform

The dangers posed to audit quality by the conflict of interest
bound up in ancillary consulting arrangements have been widely
discussed. The Big Five firms marketed their advisory services very
aggressively. They sold tax products having a record of going over the
They also marketed SPE arrangements.
line of legality.278
Significantly, the more aggressive the accounting implicated in the
products, the more important it has been that the seller firm also be the
auditor. The sales relationship imports a favorable audit. Alternatively,
aggressive transactional "products" have been sold by investment
bankers complete with opinion letters from Big Five firms opining
conformity to GAAP. The letter serves to constrain later objections
279
from an auditor.
Former SEC chair Arthur Levitt made audit quality and auditor
independence a primary agenda item in an accounting regulation
initiative launched in the late 1990s. He did not achieve what he
requested-a per se ban on consulting by auditors.28o fufluence activity
in Washington by the Big Five firms, led by Andersen, prevented that.
Instead, amendments to the SEC accounting rules which became
Misconduct and An Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1135 (1977). For an
application respecting audits, see Prentice, supmnote 270, at 184-86.
276. For a discussion addressed to Andersen as a whole, see Ken Brown & Jonathan
Weil, Questioning the Books: HowAndersen sEmbmce ofConsultingAltered the Culture of
theAuditing Firm, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 12,2002, at Cl.
277. Internal Arthur Andersen Memorandum, from Michael D. Jones to David B.
Duncan (Feb. 6, 2001) (on file \vith author).
278. Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The HustJingofXRated Shelters, FORBES, Dec.
14, 1998, at 198.
279. "Robert K. Herdman, the SEC's chief account [has] called for a ban on such
letters!' Floyd Norris, Can Investors Believe Cash Flow Numbers?, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15,
2002, atCl.
280. Arthur Levitt, Editorial, WhoAudits theAuditors?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2002, at
A29.
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effective in 2001 prohibited subcategories of nonaudit servicesspecifically, infonnation systems design and internal audit services.
Additional proxy statement disclosures also were required. 2s1 A glance
at Enron's 2001 proxy statement shows Enron and Andersen to have
been in compliance.282
a.

Blaming the Rules

The Big Five's first response to Enron was business as usual.
Even with his ftnn's reputation on the line, Joe Berardino, the
managing partner of Arthur Andersen, joined Enron's officers in
pointing fmgers elsewhere. The real failure, he said, lay in the
accounting rules themselves, which after all permit off-balance sheet
financing through SPEs. If something went wrong with Enron's
fmancials, then the problem lay with the rules, which ought to be
rethought, not with Andersen's audit. Worse, the whole accounting
system needs overhauling. Standards get set too slowly. The system's
reliance on historical cost rather than fair value is antiquated in a world
needing continuous disclosure for "today's 2417 capital markets.,,2S3 All
of this turned Enron into a mess:
Enron disclosed reams of infonnation, including an eight-page
Management's Discussion & Analysis and 16 pages of footnotes in its
2000 annual report. Some analysts studied these, sold short and made
profits. But other sophisticated analysts and fund managers have said
that, although they were confused, they bought and lost money.
We need to fix this problem. We can't long maintain trust in our
capital markets with a fmancial reporting system that delivers volumes
of complex infonnation about what happened in the past, but leaves
some investors with limited understanding of what's happening at the
284
present and what is likely to occur in the future.

Writing about Enron a few days later, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
made substantially similar observations: We need, he said, to fmd
"solutions instead of scapegoats." We need current, as opposed to
periodic disclosures including trend infonnation; we need evaluative
data in addition to historical cost infonnation; and we need faster
standard setting within the accounting profession. The SEC, for its
281. HER\VTIZ & BARREIT, supra note 8, at 196-98. The new subcategories joined an
existing list of prohibited services.
282. Enron Schedule 14A, supra note 138, at 13.
283. Joe Berardino, Editorial, Enron: A Wake-Up CaIl, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at
A18.
284. Id
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part, wants to foster a more cooperative environment, in which an
auditor could look to the agency as a ''hospitable sounding board.,,28s
Andersen and the other big accounting fIrms immediately took
up Pitt's offer, sending the agency a joint letter amounting to a
challenge. To restore confIdence, the SEC should supply "immediate
guidance" to public companies respecting disclosure of off-balance
sheet transactions, over-the-counter derivative contracts, and related
party transactions in time to impact :tvID&A in 2001 reports. ill
particular, the SEC should require issuers to provide more details
respecting off-balance sheet guarantees, commitments, lease, and debt
arrangements which could impact on credit ratings, earnings, cash
flow, or stock price.286
These reactions from the actors most responsible for the proper
operation of the accounting system must be viewed as surprising, at
least by anyone who took the time to read Emon's 2000 Annual Report
in light of the events of October and November 2001. Few can
question that more current value information in fmancial reports
usefully could supplement historical cost fIgures. But this issue, which
has been a focal point of discussion between the accounting profession
and business community for some time, only bears on the Emon
disaster as a possible exacerbating factor. Emon used fair value
accounting to a signifIcant extent. Analysts confused by Emon's
:MD&A could have been disabused of inaccurate notions about the
frrm's fmancial condition with accurate reports ofpasttransactions.
It is true that openness in the framework of GAAP makes it
harder for accounting frrms to say no to big clients. But how open is
GAAP's framework? SignifIcantly, in the wake of Emon-related stock
market reverses of early 2002, commentators began voicing the
opposite complaint. The problem "vith GAAP, they said, is that it
presents an exhaustive check-the-box system of rules. The auditors
apply the rules mechanically, ignoring the substance of the clients'
transactions.287 Even Harvey Pitt, distancing himself from his former
clients, has chimed in:
Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far too
detailed prescriptive requirements for companies and their accountants
285. Pitt, supronote 222, atA18.
286. Judith Burns & Michael Schroeder, Accounting Firms Ask SEC for Post-Enron
Guide, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, atA16.
287. Steve Liesman, SEC Accounting Cop s Warning: Playing By Rules May Not
Ward OffFroud Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,2002, at Cl; Leaders: The Lessons Hom Enron,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002, at 9.
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to follow.... We seek to move toward a principles-based set of
accounting standards, where mere compliance with technical
prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective.288
From all of this there arises a question: Wherein lies the problem with
GAAP-too many rules, as these commentators assert, or too many
standards, as the Big Five asserted?
The answer is that the problem lies in neither place. There can
never be a 100% directive rulebook in accounting anymore than there
is in any other regulatory context. Nor can slavish rule application
ever be trusted to yield perfect results. There is always a moment of
judgment. Accordingly, GAAP, of necessity, mixes rules and standards
and always will do so. Meanwhile, if we return to the application of
GAAP to the facts of this case in this Article's previous Part, we see
that the rules, applied in good faith, were more than adequate to pick
up every material event in the story of Enron's collapse. Contrary to
the Big Five's assertions, Enron's auditor did not proceed at the mercy
of vague or incoherent rules. Contrary to Mr. Pitt's assertions, a move
to standards solves nothing. Standards only work when the actor
authorized to apply them is ready to take responsibility for a judgment
call.
Why, given a world where neither a commendation of rules nor of
standards ever solves a regulatory problem, has the Enron audit failure
triggered this bizarre rules versus standards debate? The most
plausible answers are denial and avoidance. If GAAP is not
fundamentally flawed, then the solution to the Enron problem lies on
the enforcement side, where we encounter some highly problematic
institutional arrangements.
b.

Deepening Crisis and Manifest Inadequacy

The foregoing back-and-forth between the Big Five and Harvey
Pitt occurred before the revelation of document shredding in
Andersen's Houston office and the spectacle of a stock market going
south due to a lack of confidence in fmancial reports. These
developments revealed the manifest inadequacy of a strategy of cozy
cooperation between the SEC and the Big Five. Something had to be
done. 289
288. Pitt Testimony, supra note 257, at 5.
289. The SEC has announced that it will be introducing a series of Enron-related
amendments to existing disclosure rules. See SEC Press Release, Feb. 13, 2002, supra note
224. All are welcome. None address the core problem respecting the audit function.
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Pitt made the fIrst move, addressing the accounting profession's
He proposed an
toothless internal disciplinary structure.290
independent regulatory body, governed by an independent board, to be
effectuated only with the cooperation of the Big Five.291 Critics
pounced immediately, arguing that too many CPAs would be present in
the proposed enforcement structure.292 And, indeed, Pitt's proposal did
not come close to restoring confIdence in the wake of Enron. Given a
serious capture problem, there is no assurance that a disciplinary
structure with bite will suffice to realign misaligned incentives. After
all, the reputational stakes remain very substantial in the absence of a
strict regime of professional self-regulation. Yet they did not prevent
the Enron audit failure.
And so have actors in government and the Big Five been forced
to return to Arthur Levitt's agenda. Congress has taken the lead,
nothing further of signillcance having been heard from Mr. Pitt.293
Separation between the audit function and consulting can be effected
two ways.m The fIrst is a half-way measure under which the auditing
fInn may not do any consulting for the audit client. Legislation to this
effect has been introduced.295 In addition, companies are announcing
290. Coffee, supra note 271, at 51.
291. Schroeder, supra note 11, at C1. The suggestion originated with Professor
Coffee, although in a much more robust formulation. Coffee, supra note 271, at 52.
292. Diana B. Henriques, Policing the Accountants JWth a Watchdog From the
Accounting Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at A12. The critics claim that the
defendants could stall the process until the completion of overlapping litigation and that the
absence of subpoena power will disable the enforcers from gathering necessary evidence. To
import such power, a statute is needed. See Mike McNamee, Pitts Accounting Fix Leaves a
Lot Broke, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at 38,38-39. For a more plausible regulation scheme for
the accounting profession, see Dodd-Corzine, S. 2002, 107th Congo §§ 101-104 (2002).
293. At one point Pitt said that no issue should be off the table in Enron's wake,
implying no opposition to significant regulation of the accounting profession. David
Leonhardt, How WiD Washington Read the Signs? The Racels on For Tougher Regulation of
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2002, at MBI. Later he returned to advocacy of the status
quo. Pitt Testimony, supra note 257, at 25-27.
294. Lesser governance reforms also have been mooted ,videly. Under one of these
the audit committee would take entire responsibility for auditor selection. This regulation
would be welcome. But it would not solve the problem of implied pressure stemming from
consulting income: If management dislikes the audit result, it simply charmels its consulting
business elsewhere. Mandatory rotation of the audit firm would ameliorate this pressure. But
the cure would still be partial. In a world ,vith only four large audit firms, all selling the same
advice, rotation would not insulate the auditor from pressure to sanction aggressive
treatments.
295. See S. 2004, 107th Congo § 201 (2002) (prohibiting accounting IIrmS from
providing management consulting services); Auditor Independence Act of 2002, S. 1896,
107th Congo (2002) (prohibiting accounting firms from providing management consulting
services); H.R. 3693, 107th Congo (2002) (directing the SEC by rule to prohibit an
accountant also providing noncredit services from being treated as independent);
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new policies of auditor independence.296 Either way, there remains a
problem. In a limited world of four finns, all selling the same
aggressive products, one can still imagine pressure on the auditors to
be cooperative. For a return to adversity, a Glass Steagall regime of
separation may be necessary. Under this, the big firms would be
unbundled and auditing fIrms would perform only one function.
Sensing movement toward the more drastic solution, each of the
big finns announced early in 2002 that it had divested itself or would
be divesting itself of consulting operations.297 At the same time, the
fIrms announced that they will no longer perform internal audit work
for their audit clients.298 Additional details were conspicuously lacking,
however. Did "divestiture" mean 100% separation between the
Or, were the fIrms'
auditing fIrm and the consulting fIrm?
announcements designed to deflect attention from legislated
separation, importing no commitment to permanent (or even present)
separation? The latter quickly proved the case. When Andersen, under
the ministrations of Paul Volcker, announced that it really was going to
turn itself into an audit-only firm, the other four fIrms promptly
separated themselves. Still acting in concert, they announced that they
had no similar intentions.299
Meanwhile, further signifIcant movement to fair value
accounting should be deferred. If the audit system cannot be relied
upon to apply cost-basis accounting under a rule of conservatism, it
presumptively is unready to apply the more complex and subjective
measures implicated by a fair value system. Conservatism and hard
numbers are not the disease here. They are the cure. Further
movement to fair value measures can await the restoration of
confIdence in the audit system. It was, after all, fair value treatment
that enabled Enron to cover $1.1 billion of losses with swaps that
weren't.

Accountability for Accountants Act of 2002 H.R. 3617, 107th Congo (2002) (withdrawing
benefits ofPSLRA from auditors who perform nonaudit functions).
296. Companies Mull Separation ofAuditing, Consulting, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 4, 2002, at
A6.
297. Rachel Emma Silverman, Questioning the Books: Deloitte to Separate
ConsultingServicesFromAuditBusiness, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 6, 2002, atA8.
298. Id
299. Michael Schroeder & Greg Hitt, Questioning the Books: Big Accounting Firms
Break Ties JWth Andersen to Resist Changes, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 4, 2002, atAI O.
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Audits and Shareholder Value Maximization

Had Arthur Levitt still been the chair of the SEC, we would have
heard a very different set of observations in respect ofEnron's collapse
than those of Harvey Pitt, described above.3°O Levitt's warnings
respecting the institutional framework and operations of the
accounting system covered most of the salient points in the Enron
disclosure disaster-the compromise of auditor independence, the
tendency of issuers to manage their net earnings so as to meet analyst's
growth expectations, and material nondisclosures justified under the
percentage-based materiality principle. Most of all, Levitt warned that
the entire fmancial community followed perverse short-term
incentives:
I'm challenging corporate management and Wall Street to re-examine
our current environment. I believe we need to embrace nothing less
than a cultural change. For corporate managers, remember, the
integrity of the numbers in the fmancial reporting system is directly
related to the long-term interests of a corporation. While the
temptations are great, and the pressures strong, illusions in numbers are
only that-ephemeral, and ultimately self-destructive.301

The cultural pathology to which Levitt referred is the culture of
shareholder value maximization, aggressively pursued. That culture
has changed the nature of the auditor-client relationship. fu a free
market context it is the managers and not auditors who do the valuecreating. The auditors, like the SEC, regulate the free market, and the
present environment of value maximization does not easily concede
authority to market regulators. fu theory, the auditor-client relationship
should have a significant adversarial aspect. Management chooses the
accounting policies and practices and the auditor conducts a critical
If management's choices fall outside the accounting
review.
profession's substantive parameters, the auditor imposes compliance
with GAAP, wielding the threat of an unfavorable opinion. fu today's
practice context, the threat has become idle.
The accounting profession has drifted into the role of friendly
servIce provider, lured by management bribes characterized as
300. See supra notes 223 and 285 and accompanying text. Ironically, even as Enron
was running out of time, Pitt made a peace offer to the accounting profession, taking the
occasion to acknowledge with pride his prior representation in private practice of each of the
Big Five fInns. The tenus of this offer went on to inform the incongruous remarks he later
made about Enron's collapse. Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks BefOre the AICPA Governing
Council, available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch516.htm (Oct. 22, 200 I).
301. Levitt, supra note 221.
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consultancy fees. When Enron caused everybody to wake up and ask
for an enforcer, the accountants at fIrst asked us to hand the regulatory
club to someone else. The only entity equipped to pick it up was the
government, acting in the guise of exhaustive rulemaker. Thus did the
Big Five entreat the SEC to take over the articulation of GAAP, ready
to abandon their own profession's historic assumption of responsibility
respecting rulemaking. And they requested more than a transfer of the
legislative function. They asked for legislation in the form of rules.
This is because imposition of a standard implies voluntary analysis and
judgment in which imposition of a rule may be ascribed to the
rulemaker's will. The request signifies a profession in wretched
decline.
Harvey Pitt convened our post-Enron odyssey by announcing a
search for "solutions" not "scapegoats." But he offered no solutions.
The criminal justice system took over and made Andersen the
scapegoat. No doubt the remaining Big Four breathed easier at that
point, hoping that the storm will pass them by and that the new
legislation will leave their consultive gravy trains on the tracks. Their
hopes may be rewarded. But only complete separation of auditing
from consultancy can restore them to health as a profession.

V.

CONCLUSION-EN"RON AND THE WAY WE LIVE Now

Arthur Levitt's reference to the prevailing culture helps us grasp
Enron's meaning for the disclosure system, the regulation of the
accounting system, and corporate legal theory. There is nothing new
about fraudulent financials, even from repeat players with no
immediate plans to skip the jurisdiction. The operative motivations are
well-known, and Enron conforms to the pattern: The frrm becomes
risk-prone, whether it stumbles into an end period or drives itself there
in a cultural context in which it loses touch with objective controls.
Concealment occurs as it buys time until an external cure relieves its
distress.
Despite this, there is an aspect of the Enron story shaped by its
time and place. Enron and associated actors reenacted these old
pathologies on a stage set by the contemporary shareholder value
maximization norm. The norm fIrst made the transition from business
commentary to business practice in the 1980s. At the time it still had a
sharp edge of critique. In those days, managers did not pursue
shareholder value maximization. fustead they behaved in risk-averse
ways, seeking to make the company bigger and safer whether or not
that meant more for the shareholders. Actors in the capital markets
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imposed the shareholder value norm on unwilling managers through
the harsh medicine of the leveraged restructuring and the hostile
takeover.
Things changed in the 1990s. Managers internalized the norm,
building resumes as shareholder value maximizers. Stock options
better aligned their incentives with those of the shareholders. They
emerged in the risk-neutral posture counseled by financial economics.
They unbundled conglomerates and concentrated on core
competencies. They laid off excess workers. They took care to divert
free cash flow to their shareholders through open market stock
repurchases. They took on the challenge of global markets. And they
emerged as winners as they did so. The high leverage thought by
observers in the 1980s to be the key that unlocked the shareholder
value treasure turned out to be unnecessary. Its disappearance seemed
to remove a threat that pursuit of shareholder value could have
perverse effects. Many observers in the 1980s warned that high
leverage meant underinvestment in long-term projects. In the 1990s,
with the leverage strategy abandoned, shareholder value maximizing
management went forward with its only apparent costs falling on the
fIrm's disempowered constituents, the employees let go due to
relentless cost cutting. But such losers did not matter. Proponents of
America's system of corporate governance took a victory lap on the
world stage.
As the 1990s progressed, darker colors appeared in the picture.
Some began to question whether the fabulous wealth generated
through the combination of liberal stock option plans and rising stock
prices had its own perverse effects. At the same time, real-world
shareholder value maximization came to be acted out in a bubble stock
market. The bubble expanded on projections, which, however wild,
were built on the same components that imported content to the
maximization norm. The norm became a big tent that encompassed
both short-term gains in stock prices stemming from the antics of
noise traders and the more sober fundamental value maximization
precepts of economists, management scientists, and fundamental value
investors.
Managers came under pressure to satisfy both shareholder value
constituencies. But the greater pressure, of course, came from the
short-term maximization voice of the marketplace. As managers
struggled to make their numbers, they were assisted by the Big Five
accounting fIrms, who aggressively peddled tax shelter and earnings
management ruses, termed "products." Those who saw through the
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smoke and mirrors and suggested regulation, whether in the selfregulatory system, like the FASB, or in government, like Arthur Levitt,
were shouted down and subjected to threats by attack-dog
congressmen.
It all came to a head with Enron, where pressure to maximize and
a culture of winning combined to draw a huge fIrm into risk-prone
decision making. But the story is exceptional in only two respects.
First, comes the magnitude of the numbers. Second, comes the giant
step Enron's managers took across the line that separates aggressive
accounting from securities fraud. Every other critical detail,302
including aggressive treatments, auditor capture, and the cognitive
biases that facilitated the fatal step to fraud, implicates a well-known
business pathology and a concomitant and well-worn regulatory
discussion.
Meanwhile, three strong lessons emerge from the wreckage.
First, Enron collapsed the same way banks routinely collapsed in the
days before deposit insurance. It did so because it had largely
succeeded in realizing Skilling's vision of becoming a fmancial
institution. Huge fmancial institutions present special regulatory
problems and are subject to special requirements. Enron remained free
of such regulation, partly because of the speed of its transition and
partly due to its own successful influence activities. Its collapse shows
its exemption to have been unjustifIed. Emerging fmancial institutions
should be brought into the system in the ordinary course.
Second, even as additional regulatory implications devolve
largely on the auditor, avoiding the rest of the self-regulatory system,
this case controverts the often asserted claim that existing regulatory
mandates fail the cost-benefIt test. Those who make that claim rely on
market forces and the self-interest of inside actors who face market
discipline to assure providers of outside capital against the existence of
shabby shops. That the fInn with the seventh largest market
capitalization and also the firm that preached market discipline the
most loudly turned out to be the shabbiest of shops with the
cooperation of outside directors, outside auditors, and institutional
investors, highlights the limits on what self-regulation and market
incentives can achieve. Sovereign mandate and punishment remain
capitalism's bedrock.
Third, a century and a half ago, conservatives steeped in the
classical economic model of Adam Smith voiced suspicions about the
302. To the extent of present public knowledge.
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accumulation of significant assets within corporate organizations.
Only when human beings owned property, they said, could individual
interest and moral responsibility work together to keep the use of the
property consonant with the interests of society as whole. Corporate
ownership subverted market control of private economic power and
diluted responsibility amongst the members of a groUp.303 We still hear
many voices advocating market control. But we hear it in a
fundamentally different context in which corporations, rather than
individuals, own the producing assets. For that reason, market controls
taken alone cannot possibly assure responsible use of economic power.
For the same reason, we should treat with utmost skepticism actors
who preach market discipline from positions of safety behind the
shields of corporate entities.

303. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIl\1ACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 43, 45, 48 55-57 (1970).
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